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SUMMARY
Most provincial health care systems in Canada combine public,
private non-profit, and private for-profit delivery. In Alberta, the Health
Care Protection Act, known as Bill 11, allows the public to purchase
certain insured surgical services from private providers. This
legislation sparked a heated and ongoing debate in Canada about the
role of competition in health care service delivery. The key question
asked is what can be gained from introducing competition among
hospital and physician services while maintaining a public payment
system.  This paper evaluates what has been learned from the recent
literature on competition in health care markets in the context of
expanding the role of the private sector in Alberta. The evidence does
not provide a definitive answer. Competition introduced by an
expanded private sector is likely to be beneficial on some measures,
indifferent on others, but not likely bad.
* I am grateful for very useful and insightful comments received by two anonymous reviewers of this paper.
I also want to acknowledge and thank Ron Kneebone and Herb Emery for comments that improved this
paper.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Most provincial health care systems in Canada combine public, private non-profit, and private
for-profit delivery. In Alberta, the Health Care Protection Act, known as Bill 11, allows for the
public purchase of some insured surgical services from private, for-profit providers. This
legislation has sparked a contentious debate about the role of competition in health care service
delivery. The key question asked is what can be gained from introducing competition among
hospital and physician services while maintaining a public payment system.
The private sector has always played an important role in the delivery of publicly financed health
care services. In 2008, 91.3% of hospital services and 98.6% of physician services were publicly
financed in Alberta. The debate surrounding Bill 11 and the 2001 Mazankowski report is often
said to be about the pros and cons of increased privatization of health care. This characterization
is not accurate, however, since the lion’s share of publicly financed services is already privately
delivered. The issue is not about making a choice between wholly public or private service
delivery for the entire system. Rather, it is about determining what services optimally can be
moved out of the full-service, non-profit hospitals under contractual arrangements with private,
for-profit specialty clinics.
After a decade, however, very little evidence has been uncovered of the effect of Bill 11 on
Alberta’s health system. Some information is available on the size and scope of public
contracting for privately provided non-hospital surgical services — for example, the number of
private, for-profit, non-hospital surgery centres increased by 46% between 1991 and 1999. In
2008, of all the province’s regional health authorities, only Capital Health in Edmonton and the
Calgary Regional Health Authority were contracting for privately provided surgical specialties,
and then only for relatively small amounts and for a small number of specialties.
Additional data are needed before one can undertake a thorough analysis of the effect of
competition — created by allowing the public purchase of private surgical services — on
consumer choice, cost, quality, and waiting lists. One can, however, learn from recent, mostly
U.S., studies on competition in health services provision. Experience in the United States with
the emergence of single-specialty hospitals and public-payer contracts with managed care are
particularly relevant for Alberta.
The evidence does not provide a definitive answer about the effect of competition in markets
where for-profit and non-profit coexist. Rather, the answer seems to be that it depends. Such a
conclusion is not surprising, however, since health care organizations are heterogeneous and
local, making it entirely possible for the effects of a single policy to vary from one region to
another. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that healthy competition and an appropriate blend of
public, private non-profit and private, for-profit delivery is likely to beneficial on some measures,
indifferent on others, but not likely bad.
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The major objections raised by opponents of competition and private, for-profit delivery at least
serve the purpose of defining “bad” outcomes, such as the hypothesized creation of a two-tier
system that leaves the public system as the “provider of last resort” and “cream skimming” that
leaves the more difficult and costly cases in the public sector. On balance, however, the evidence
does not tend to support such charges. True, a health care system runs the risk of evolving into a
two-tier system if there are multiple public and private payers and a payment system that does
not contain incentives, financial or otherwise, for providers to participate in the public sector. But
so long as the single-payer public payment system under the Canada Health Act is in place, a
two-tier system is unlikely to arise.
There is also some evidence of cream skimming in some studies of the effect of competition
between non-profit and for-profit hospitals on quality of care and the behaviour of single-
specialty hospitals in the United States. Again, however, the Canada Health Act diminishes
incentives for cream skimming by requiring that physicians accept public payment as payment
in full. Even if cream skimming were to occur, moreover, it could be beneficial from a system-
level perspective if it led to an optimal allocation of patients between full-service general
hospitals and specialty clinics. It might be socially optimal for full-service hospitals to treat the
more medically complex cases, leaving the easier cases to the specialty clinics. The challenge for
the health authority is to set budgets for acute-care general hospitals that allow them to treat
higher-cost patients without cross-subsidizing the costs with more profitable patients. A carefully
crafted public policy that encouraged competition and an appropriate mix of public, non-profit
and for-profit providers could lead to a health system that is fiscally sustainable, ensures access
to quality health care, and results in better health outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
The role and effect of competition in health care markets continues to be a hotly debated and
contentious issue in both the academic literature and the public policy arena. Most health care
systems, including Canada’s, combine public and private delivery of health care services. The
coexistence of public, private non-profit, and private for-profit providers in the same markets
raises questions about the extent and effect of competition. Understanding how health care
organizations compete and how changes in market structure affect provider behaviour,
consumer welfare, and overall system costs is critically important when considering the
injection of competition and choice into the system. One hypothesis is that competition among
for-profit and non-profit providers and the profit motive will lead to lower overall system costs,
higher quality, and improved efficiency. Yet, it is also argued that a competitive market system
will result in a two-tiered system in which the private sector practises “cream skimming,”
leaving the more difficult and costly cases in the public sector, which would seriously
compromise the long-held principle of equitable access to health care services to all without
regard to financial status.
The impact of ownership form also matters but its role in shaping the nature of competition is
far from clear. One argument is that non-profit organizations are expected to be more
concerned about the quantity and quality of services than about price. As a result, non-profit
health care organizations engage in a “medical arms race” that results in wasteful duplication
of services and higher system costs. Under this hypothesis, an appropriate blend of public,
private, and non-profit organizations will provide market-based discipline that discourages
wasteful duplication of services and encourages their efficient and effective delivery.
Alberta’s Health Care Protection Act, known at Bill 11 and passed into law in 2000, allows the
public to purchase certain insured surgical services from private providers. This legislation
sparked a heated and ongoing debate in Canada about the privatization of health care, the
breakdown of medicare, and the introduction of a two-tier health care system.1 The debate
surrounding Bill 11 undoubtedly influenced the deliberations of the Premier’s Advisory
Council on Health, culminating in the 2001 Mazankowski report.2 The debate about the
desirability of a greater role for the private sector covers two distinct issues: the public/private
mix for payment of health care services; and the non-profit/for-profit mix of service providers.
This paper focuses on the latter issue by reviewing and synthesizing the relatively recent
empirical literature on competition in health care services provision.
The key question is: what can be gained from introducing competition among service providers
— specifically, hospital and physician services — while maintaining a primarily public
payment system? Although the analysis occurs in the context of Alberta’s legislation, its
inferences apply more generally to any system of public/private delivery of health care
services.
1 See G. Currie, C. Donaldson,  and M. Lu, “What Does Canada Profit from the For-profit Debate on Health Care?”
Canadian Public Policy 29 (2, 2003): 227-251.
2 Alberta, A Framework for Reform, Report of the Premier’s Advisory Council on Health (Edmonton,
December 2001); available online at http://www.health.alberta.ca/documents/Mazankowski-Report-2001.pdf.
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BACKGROUND: A LOOK AT EARLIER ANALYSES
Competition in health care markets among public, private for-profit, and private non-profit
hospitals has emerged as a topic of extensive interest in the academic and public policy
literature. One comparison of the results of 34 US studies, published from 1980 to 2000, of
costs, quality of care, and efficiency in for-profit and non-profit hospitals, concludes that much
of the literature, in fact, is not even relevant to the Canadian context, for several reasons.3 First,
it describes only full-service hospitals. Second, non-profit hospitals in the United States are
expected to provide uncompensated care, which is not relevant for Canadian hospitals. Third,
the nature of competition among US hospitals changed after the implementation of the
prospective payment system (PPS), based on the diagnosis-related group (DRG), for Medicare
in-patient care. Fourth, many studies seek to evaluate the effect of competition on social welfare.
A study of mortality rates in the two types of hospitals in the United States, using data
collected between 1982 and 1995, suggests that adult patients had a higher risk of dying in a
private for-profit hospital than in a private non-profit hospital.4 The authors conclude that the
results are generalizable to Canada and urge Canadian policy-makers to consider the potential
for negative health outcomes associated with private for-profit hospital care when
contemplating opening the health care system to a blend of private for-profit and non-profit
delivery. This study’s unambiguous conclusion, however, is not supported by newer studies of
the quality of care in private for-profit hospitals. Another summary — of 162 studies of US
for-profit and non-profit hospitals and nursing homes in terms of their economic performance,
quality of care, and accessibility for indigent patients — concludes that ownership-related
differences vary greatly across services.5 They occur because the form of health care provider
ownership interacts in systematic ways with the context in which health care is delivered. For
example, ownership-related differences in accessibility, quality, and price might be more
pronounced in less competitive markets or less pronounced for medical services that are
relatively standardized, such as pharmaceuticals.
Nearly a decade has elapsed since the Alberta legislature passed Bill 11, yet little, if any,
analysis has been undertaken of the impact of Bill 11 on the Alberta health system. A few
literature surveys, partially or wholly motivated by Bill 11, examine the broader topics of the
effect of competition and ownership form on health care markets but are unable to speak 
3 Currie, Donaldson, and Lu, “What Does Canada Profit?”
4 P.J. Devereaux et al., “A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Studies Comparing Mortality Rates of Private For-
profit and Private Not-for-profit Hospitals,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 166 (11, 2002): 1399-1406.
5 M. Schlesinger and B.H. Gray, “How Nonprofits Matter in American Medicine, and What to Do about It,” Health
Affairs 25 (2006): W289. In contrast, meta-analyses such as those by Devereaux et al. are of limited use in informing
the debate about ownership-related differences because the methodology they use to identify eligible reviews for
inclusion in the meta-analyses eliminates the majority of citations; see P.J. Devereaux et al., “Comparison of
Mortality between Private For-profit and Private Not-for-profit Hemodialysis Centers: A Systematic Review and
Meta-analysis,” Journal of the American Medical Association 288 (19, 2002): 2449-2458; idem, “A Systematic
Review and Meta-analysis of Studies Comparing Mortality Rates of Private For-profit and Private Not-for-profit
Hospitals,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 166 (11, 2002): 1399-1406; and idem, “Payments for Care at
Private For-profit and Private Not-for-profit Hospitals: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis,” Canadian Medical
Association Journal 170 (12, 2004): 1817-1824.
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directly to the social benefits and costs associated with the public purchase of services
delivered in for-profit settings.6
Reference is often made to a well-publicized report on cataract surgery in Alberta by
W. Armstrong for the Alberta Chapter of the Consumers Association of Canada.7 The report is
primarily a qualitative analysis of Alberta’s experience with the provision of cataract surgery in
both non-profit, full-service, acute-care hospitals and private for-profit day surgery clinics. The
report documents the growth of private non-hospital surgical facilities in Alberta and compares
the costs, waiting times, and facility fees for enhanced services in Calgary and Edmonton.
Unfortunately, the comparisons are severely hampered by data limitations.8 In addition, the
study was conducted prior to the passage of Bill 11. Nonetheless, its conclusions are often cited
as evidence that for-profit provision of cataract surgery in Alberta has lengthened public
waiting lists, increased prices and costs, decreased patient choice, and created unequal levels of
coverage and quality for insured services.9 Given the highly questionable validity and
reliability of the data, these claims warrant further investigation and substantiation using data
drawn from administrative claims and appropriate statistical methods.
In a review prepared for the 2001 Romanow Commission, Deber examines the question of how
to determine whether government, non-profit, or for-profit organizations should deliver
particular programs and services.10 Within this broader context, Deber seeks to add clarity to
the discussion about the appropriate role for private delivery within Canada’s system and the
appropriate mix of public, private, and non-profit delivery. She pursues this objective by
constructing a framework for evaluating the likely performance of different delivery options.
The framework loosely describes the characteristics of public, non-profit, and private
organizations in an effort to differentiate the organization types. Deber ultimately concludes,
however, that organizations are heterogeneous and are not put neatly into distinct boxes. The
implication of the inability to treat public, non-profit, and for-profit organizational forms as
mutually exclusive entities in the context of health care delivery is that there is no clear-cut
“yes/no” answer about the best form of delivery. The best form of delivery might differ across
health care sectors; indeed, depending on the system’s goals, objectives, and values, a
particular form of delivery might be less desirable in any sector.
6 See W. Armstrong, “The Consumer Experience with Cataract Surgery and Private Clinics in Alberta: Canada’s
Canary in the Mine Shaft” (Edmonton: Consumers’ Association of Canada (Alberta), 2000); C. Donaldson and G.
Currie, “The Public Purchase of Private Surgical Services: A Systematic Review of the Evidence on Efficiency and
Equity,” Working Paper 00-9 (Edmonton: Institute of Health Economics, 2000); Currie, Donaldson, and Lu, “What
Does Canada Profit?”; and R.B. Deber, “Delivering Health Care: Public, Not-for-profit, or Private?” In The Fiscal
Sustainability of Health Care in Canada, Romanow Papers 1, edited by G.P. Marchildon, T. McIntosh, and P.G.
Forest (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
7 Armstrong, “The Consumer Experience with Cataract Surgery and Private Clinics in Alberta.”
8 Armstrong points out that confidentiality clauses in the contracts with private surgical clinics and restrictions on
access to individual physician and facility billings make it impossible to obtain the data necessary to analyze
rigorously the effect of private for-profit clinics on costs, quality, and access (ibid., p. 58). Data were obtained via
phone calls to 48 ophthalmologists’ offices in May and June 1998 placed by representatives of the Consumers’
Association of Canada (Alberta). Posing as a relative of a prospective patient, the representatives asked questions
about wait times, soonest available appointments, surgery site, additional charges, and optional enhanced services (p.
76).
9 Ibid., p. viii.
10 Deber, “Delivering Health Care.”
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The question of what can be gained from introducing competition among service providers
remains open. This paper evaluates what has been learned from the relatively recent literature
on competition in health care markets from the perspective of a health care system in
evolution. From the evidence, it will become clear that generalizations about the effect of
competition in health care markets are difficult to make, in part because health care is
heterogeneous, as are the interactions among players in the market. 
The primary objective of this literature review is to assess qualitatively the findings of
numerous studies in the context of expanding the role of the private sector in Alberta. Deber’s
2004 review sends the clear message that there is no single best way to deliver all health care
services. The issue is not about making a choice between wholly public or private service
delivery for the entire system. Instead, it is about determining what services can be moved out
of full-service, non-profit hospitals under contractual agreements with private, for-profit
providers and what gains can be achieved for the quality and cost of care in Alberta. We can
also learn more about this issue from the recent emergence of single-specialty hospitals in the
United States and the experiences of public payers (Medicare and Medicaid) with managed
care.11 It is beyond the scope of this paper, however, to offer policy recommendations
concerning expanding the role of the private sector in Alberta or to assess the resources that
would be needed to change the current system.
11 Medicare and Medicaid are public programs in the United States. The primary objective of the Medicare program is
to provide health insurance for covered hospital, physician, and prescription drug services to persons ages 65 and
over. Medicaid is a similar program for some people whose incomes are some percentage below federally defined
poverty levels. According to the National Library of Medicine, the term “managed care” encompasses programs that
are intended to reduce unnecessary health care costs through a variety of mechanisms, including: economic
incentives for physicians and patients to select less costly forms of care; programs for reviewing the medical
necessity of specific services; increased beneficiary cost sharing; controls on in-patient admissions and lengths of
stay; the establishment of cost-sharing incentives for outpatient surgery; selective contracting with health care
providers; and the intensive management of high-cost health care cases.
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HEALTH SERVICES IN ALBERTA
Private Responsibility for Health Care
The organization of Alberta’ health care system has undergone significant reforms over the
years. Prior to 1994, the delivery of health services was organized around a physician-centred
medical professional model.12 In this organizational framework, the physician-patient
relationship was the most important component and physicians were involved in resource
allocation decisions at all levels. In 1994, the numerous health boards in this decentralized
medical professional model were replaced by larger, centralized regional health authorities
(RHAs), the objective of which was to improve the continuity, efficiency, and effectiveness of
care. The RHAs were given global budgets, to be allocated in a manner that optimally served
the health care needs of each region’s population. Further consolidation occurred in May 2008
when the RHAs and other boards were replaced by a single Alberta Health Services (AHS)
Board. The main task of the board is to coordinate the delivery of health services across the
province. Alongside organizational reform, emphasis on private responsibility for health care
has been an ongoing theme in the Alberta system.13 Bill 11 and some recommendations in the
Mazankowski report reflect that agenda. Much of the recent motivation for the agenda is the
persistent rise in public expenditure on health care, particularly in difficult economic times, and
concerns about access to quality health care.14
Bill 11 was introduced in the spring 2000 session of the Alberta legislature amid substantial
federal and provincial debate.15 The bill expanded the role of for-profit private clinics within
the public system by allowing RHAs to contract with private, for-profit surgical facilities. It
also expanded the role of private clinics by allowing them to perform more complicated
procedures that might require overnight stays;16 in essence, these private facilities are
tantamount to single-specialty hospitals in the United States. Bill 11’s introduction came after
Alberta reached an agreement with the federal government regarding transfer payments and
facility fees.17 As part of the settlement discussions, the federal and provincial health ministers 
12 See T. Reay and C.R. Hinings, “The Recomposition of an Organizational Field: Health Care in Alberta,”
Organization Studies 26 (3 2005): 351-384.
13 For detailed discussions of the historical progression of policy initiatives that encourage or permit a greater role for
the private sector in Alberta’s health care system, see Armstrong, “The Consumer Experience with Cataract Surgery
and Private Clinics in Alberta”; and C. Scott, T. Horne, and W.E. Thurston, “The Differential Impact of Health Care
Privatization on Women in Alberta” (Winnipeg: Prairie Women’s Health Centre for Excellence, 2000). 
14 Alberta’s real per capita government health expenditures grew from $1,679 in 1975 to $3,696 in 2007, a median
annual growth rate of 3.5%; see L. Di Matteo and R. Di Matteo, “The Fiscal Sustainability of Alberta’s Public Health
Care System,” SPS Research Papers, The Health Series 2 (Calgary: University of Calgary, School of Policy Studies,
2009).
15 The legislation’s primary focus is on the provision of acute care services in non-profit hospitals and approved for-
profit surgical facilities. An important departure from that focus in terms of ongoing health care reform initiatives in
Alberta is Part 4, which addresses the formation of the Premier’s Advisory Council on Health (Scott, Horne, and
Thurston, “The Differential Impact,” p. 33).
16 See R. Cairney, “Alberta Ignores Vocal Opposition, Presses Ahead with Law to Expand Role of Private Clinics,”
Canadian Medical Association Journal 162 (11, 2000): 1606-1607; and S. Shortt, “Alberta’s Bill 11: Will Trade
Tribunals Set Domestic Health Policy?” Canadian Medical Association Journal 164 (6, 2001): 798-799.
17 For a detailed discussion of the politics surrounding Bill 11 and federal enforcement of the Canada Health Act, see
G. Boychuk, “The Regulation of Private Health Funding and Insurance in Alberta under the Canada Health Act: A
Comparative Cross-provincial Perspective,” SPS Research Papers, The Health Series 1 (Calgary: University of
Calgary, School of Policy Studies, 2008).
8
agreed to 12 principles governing Alberta’s approach to public and private health services.
Seven of the 12 address issues related to the private purchase and provision of health services,
but principle 11 — which recognizes that physicians can receive payment from both the
publicly funded system and fully private sources — is believed to underlie the provisions of
Bill 11.18 The Canada Health Act permits this practice, but no province actually allows private
funding to the full degree permitted.19
Bill 11 states that “no person shall operate a private hospital in Alberta” and that surgical
services may be provided only in public hospitals or approved surgical facilities.20 What
distinguishes approved surgical facilities from full-service, acute-care hospitals is not clearly
defined in the bill but it is clear that an approved surgical facility could provide only a limited
range of services, including uninsured in-patient surgical services. The bill further states that
private surgical facilities are not allowed to bill patients directly for medically necessary
services or to engage in activities that result in “queue jumping.” Direct billing is allowed,
however, for enhanced non-medical services. The stated intent of Bill 11 was to protect the
public health system and to reduce waiting lists for surgical procedures. In addition, contracts
with RHAs would be approved only if they improved access to health services and were
cheaper than the public system.21
The Premier’s Advisory Council on Health was given a clear directive to “provide strategic
advice to the Premier on the preservation and future enhancement of quality health care
services for Albertans and on the continuing sustainability of the publicly funded health
system.”22 As its report notes, the Council listened to both sides of the debate in crafting its
policy recommendations but concluded that a system dominated by the public sector stifles
innovation and choice. The report’s general reform recommendation was to encourage more
choice, more competition, and more accountability.23 This was followed by specific
recommendations to dissolve the government monopoly on health care and to “unbundle” the
system. This recommendation was further expounded upon in a sub-recommendation to
encourage an innovative blend of public, private, and non-profit organizations and facilities to
deliver health care services. The Council argued that, as long as insured health care services
were publicly funded and standards were in place, it should not matter if the provider was
organized as a private for-profit, private non-profit, or public entity.24 The health authority
should have the latitude to purchase services from either sector as deemed appropriate.
Expanding options for private sector delivery could serve to open up the system by introducing
healthy competition — that is, competition with the potential to strengthen both the public and
private sectors.
18 Scott, Horne, and Thurston, “The Differential Impact,” pp. 32, 42.
19 Boychuk, “The Regulation of Private Health Funding and Insurance in Alberta,” p. 12.
20 See Scott, Horne, and Thurston, “The Differential Impact,” p. 33.
21 See Cairney, “Alberta Ignores Vocal Opposition”; Scott, Horne, and Thurston, “The Differential Impact”; and Shortt,
“Alberta’s Bill 11.”
22 Alberta, A Framework for Reform, p. 11.
23 Ibid., p. 48.
24 Ibid., p. 51.
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The Growing Role of Private Financing
The growth in total expenditures on health care has outpaced inflation in most countries over
the past thirty years, and Canada is no exception. In Alberta, over the 1976-2007 period, the
growth of real per capita government health expenditures (3.5% annually) has outpaced total
government revenue growth (1.7%) and growth of gross domestic product (2.2%).25 One policy
response to this persistent growth in health spending is to reduce pressure on the public budget
by shifting some of the responsibility for health care spending onto the private sector.26 The
private sector has always played an important role in the delivery of health care services; today,
it also plays an important role in the financing of services.27 The major shift to private sector
spending occurred between 1992 and 1996, when inflation-adjusted public spending per capita
declined by 2% while private-sector spending increased by 14%.28 Since 1997, however, shares
of total health expenditures have remained stable at 70% public and 30% private.29
Table 1 shows the public-private split by use of funds for Alberta in 1999 and 2008. Of
particular note is the proportion of public funding allocated to privately provided hospital and
physician services. In Canada, nearly all acute-care general hospitals are organized as private
non-profit hospitals, and physicians are organized into privately owned, for-profit practices.
Alberta does not differ from the rest of the country in this regard. In addition, diagnostic and
laboratory services are provided primarily by private, for-profit professional corporations.
Hence, the practice of private delivery of publicly insured services is hardly novel in Alberta.
In fact, as the Mazankowski report notes, the Canada Health Act does not prohibit the private
delivery of health care services; rather, it says that, although hospital and physician services
must be publicly funded and administered, they can be delivered in the private sector through a
contractual arrangement with the health authority.30 The heated debate sparked by the passage
of Bill 11 and the Mazankowski report is often misconstrued to be about the pros and cons of
increased privatization of health care. This characterization is not accurate since the lion’s
share of publicly financed services is already privately delivered. The debate is really about the
pros and cons of increased public funding of private for-profit health care — most notably,
hospital care. Table 1 shows a decline in public expenditures for hospital services. This decline
reflects a worldwide trend toward shifting many components of traditional in-patient hospital
care to non-hospital settings where private for-profit ownership dominates.
25 Di Matteo and Di Matteo, “The Fiscal Sustainability of Alberta’s Public Health Care System,” 8.
26 The Canadian Institute for Health Information defines public and private sector spending in the National Health
Expenditures database. Public sector spending is health care spending by government and government agencies,
which includes the provincial government sector, the federal direct sector, the municipal government sector, and
social security funds. Private sector spending includes out-of-pocket expenditures, health insurance claims paid by
insurance companies on behalf of individuals or to individuals, and non-consumption health expenditures. Non-
consumption expenditures include non-patient revenues such as donations and investment income, private spending
on health-related capital, and health research funded by private sources. See Canadian Institute for Health
Information, National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975-2008 (Ottawa: CIHI, 2008), pp. 63-63.
27 For a discussion of the range of options for provincial regulation of private funding of health care services under the
Canada Health Act, see Boychuk, “The Regulation of Private Health Funding and Insurance in Alberta.”
28 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Exploring the 70/30 Split: How Canada’s Health Care System Is
Financed (Ottawa: CIHI, 2005), p. 19.
29 Canadian Institute for Health Information, National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975-2008.
30 Alberta, A Framework for Reform, p. 23.
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TABLE 1: The Public-Private Split by Use of Funds, Alberta, 1999 and 2008
HOSPITALS             PHYSICIAN CARE OTHER PROFESSIONALS
YEAR Public Private Public Private Public Private
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
1999 92.3 7.7 98.5 1.5 11.8 88.2
2008 91.3 8.7 98.6 1.4 8.7 91.5
% change -1.1 13.4 0.1 -5.2 -26.1 3.5
DRUGS                        CAPITAL               OTHER SPENDING
YEAR Public Private Public Private Public Private
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
1999 31.9 68.1 66.3 33.7 60.0 40.0
2008 35.5 64.5 86.2 13.8 58.2 41.8
% change 11.0 -5.2 29.9 -58.9 -3.1 4.6
SOURCE: Canadian Institute for Health Information, National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975-2008.
Private Non-hospital Surgical Facilities
The provincial health insurance plan recognizes non-hospital surgical and diagnostic facilities
that offer procedures that do not require an overnight stay in the facility for post-operative
recovery, operation, or diagnosis. The facilities must be accredited by the College of Physicians
and Surgeons of Alberta. According to data maintained by the College, there was a dramatic
increase in the number of private surgical clinics beginning in the late 1980s: from 8 in 1985,
the number jumped to 36 by 1991. The rate of growth later declined, but by 1999 there were
53 accredited facilities, an increase of 46% since 1991. Annual reports of the Canada Health
Act indicate that, after 1999, no new facilities were accredited until 2005, when there were 58
non-hospital surgical facilities, 26 of which had contracts to provide medically insured services
under the Health Care Protection Act. In 2008, there were 63 accredited non-hospital surgical
facilities but no change in the number of facilities with contracts under the Health Care
Protection Act.31 The increase in the number of private surgical clinics is consistent with
Alberta’s policy initiatives to expand the role of the private sector in health. The growth occurs
at a time of capacity reductions in the non-profit hospital sector and follows implementation of
the Regional Health Authorities Act, which specifically allows regions to contract with private
providers of services.
31 Canada, Health Canada, Canada Health Act Annual Report 2007-2008 (Ottawa, 2008), p. 147.
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The Health Care Protection Act requires that operators of non-hospital surgical facilities report
the number of insured surgical procedures they perform and any revenue from the sale of
enhanced medical goods and services connected with the procedure. The RHAs report the
value and expenses associated with the contracts in their annual audited financial statements.
Table 2 shows the value and number of insured surgical procedures performed for all contracts
approved by the RHAs under the Health Care Protection Act for 2008. All of the contracts are
with either Capital Health in Edmonton or Calgary Regional Health Authority.
Only a few surgical specialties are contracted out, including dermatology (in Edmonton only),
ophthalmology, oral surgery, otolaryngology (in Edmonton only), orthopaedic surgery (in
Calgary only), plastic surgery (in Edmonton only), and reproductive health. Even though the
Calgary Regional Health Authority had contracts with fewer specialties, the total value of the
contracts in 2008 exceeded the total value of those in Edmonton — $25 million versus $4.8
million. In Edmonton, the largest contracts, in terms of value and number of procedures, are in
reproductive health (45% of the total value of contracts), followed by ophthalmology (24%,
almost all of whose procedures are cataract surgeries). In Calgary, orthopaedic surgery
accounts for 52% and ophthalmology for 41% of the total value of contracts.
TABLE 2: Value and Volume of Approved Contracts with Private Surgical Facilities, by Specialty,
Edmonton and Calgary, 2008
CAPITAL HEALTH CALGARY REGIONAL
(EDMONTON) HEALTH AUTHORITY
SPECIALTY
Contract Value Volume Contract Value Volume
($ thousands) ($ thousands)
Dermatology 329 199 - -
Ophthalmology 1,181 2,365 10,329 12,949
Oral surgery 745 1,737 213 508
Otolaryngology 157 193 - -
Orthopedic surgery - - 13,000 915
Plastic surgery 296 1,207 - -
Reproductive health 2,180 5,570 1,550 n/a
SOURCES: Contract values from Alberta Health and Wellness, audited financial statements; volume data
from Alberta Health and Wellness, annual reports of Capital Health and Calgary RHA on
contracts with non-hospital surgical facilities.
Table 3 shows expenses of approved contracts with private surgical facilities, total public
expenditures for hospital services in Alberta, and the expenditures for contracted non-hospital
surgical procedures as a percent of total public expenditures. This “back-of-the-envelope”
calculation of public spending on privately contracted services suggests that it accounts for
only a very small portion of total public spending on hospital services: slightly more than
one-third of 1% in 2008.
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TABLE 3: Total Value and Expenses of Approved Contracts with Private Surgical Facilities,
Alberta, 2005-2008
APPROVED TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENSES AS %
CONTRACT EXPENDITURES — OF TOTAL
YEAR
EXPENSES HOSPITAL EXPENDITURES
($ thousands) ($ thousands) (percent)
2005 12,010 4,419,782 0.27
2006 16,001 4,807,263 0.33
2007 20,213 5,183,930 0.39
2008 21,598 5,584,290 0.39
NOTE: Calculations assume that expenditures for contracted services under the Health Care Protection Act 
are reflected in total public expenditures for hospital service in the national health expenditures 
account.
SOURCES: Contract expenses from Alberta Health and Wellness, audited financial statements; total
public expenditures — hospital from Canadian Institute fo Health Information, National
Health Expenditure Trends, 1975-2008.
In summary, the data presented here, though limited, do provide some information on the size
and scope of public contracting for privately provided non-hospital surgical services allowed
under the Health Care Protection Act. The number of private, for-profit, non-hospital surgery
centres has increased significantly since 1985, but the number of contracts with these facilities
has remained stable since passage of the Health Care Protection Act and they appear to
account for a very small percentage of public spending on health care in Alberta. These limited
data cannot yet answer questions about the effects of allowing the public purchase of private
surgical services on consumer choice, cost, quality, and waiting lists. Given the limitations in
addressing such questions directly with analyses of the impact Bill 11 on Alberta’s health care
system, one must rely on studies of competition in other health care markets that might be
relevant for the situation in Alberta.
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THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
ON HEALTH CARE MARKETS
There is an extensive literature on the effects of competition in health care markets (more
specifically, hospital markets) and of organization structure on performance indicators such as
costs, efficiency, profitability, prices, access to care, and quality. Typically, reviews of this
literature are motivated by a particular question: how should a health care system determine
whether services should be provided by a public, non-profit or for-profit organization?;32 are
non-profit organizations sufficiently different from for-profit organizations to justify their tax
exemption?;33 is quality of care lower in for-profit hospitals?;34 is the United States experience
with for-profit and non-profit care relevant for Canada?35 The literature review undertaken in
this paper is thus no different in that it, too, is motivated by a particular question: Can
competition and profits lead to lower system costs, higher quality, and improved efficiency in
markets where for-profit and not-for-profit providers coexist? That question — coupled with
recommendations in the Mazankowski report to “open up the system” and “encourage
competition, choice, and an innovative blend of for-profit and non-profit delivery” — frames
this discussion of the evidence. The organization and structure of the review is a product of the
review’s motivating question — that is, the discussion of the evidence from salient studies is
framed to highlight lessons from the interaction of competition and profits in health care
markets that are heterogeneous with respect to organizational structure and degree of
competition.
Most of the literature focuses on the United States, and so most of the studies reviewed here
are also based on U.S. data. Nevertheless, the U.S. experience with for-profit and non-profit
organizations coexisting in markets with different levels of competitiveness and responding to
similar changes in the regulatory environment is relevant for Canada. It is often the differences
between the Canadian and U.S. health care systems that drive study design and interpretation
of results. Although Canada differs fundamentally from the United States with respect to
financing health insurance, the two countries are remarkably similar with respect to delivery of
care. The majority of acute-care general hospitals in the United States are organized as private
non-profit organizations, while long-term care facilities, physicians, pharmacies, and home care
agencies are largely private for-profit organizations. Except for having a small share of for-
profit acute-care general hospitals, Canada is very similar to the United States in this area.
32 Deber, “Delivering Health Care.”
33 Schlesinger and Gray, “How Nonprofits Matter in American Medicine.”
34 Devereaux et al., “Payments for Care.”
35 Currie, Donaldson, and Lu, “What Does Canada Profit?”
Costs and Efficiency
The effects of competition and ownership status on costs and technical or allocative efficiency
have been studied extensively. The empirical approaches employed in the studies vary but can
be placed roughly in two broad categories: studies that examine efficiency or inefficiencies in
costs and production through cost-function estimation; and studies that examine the effects of
consolidation in hospital markets (through system affiliation, mergers, and closures) on costs
and efficiency. Studies that estimate cost functions typically explore the behavioural
differences between non-profit and for-profit hospitals by controlling for ownership type in the
analysis. Studies that examine the effects of consolidation on hospital costs tackle the issue of
the effect of competition in health care markets from the other side of the coin by asking if a
reduction in competition through consolidation leads to efficiency gains through exploiting
potential economies of scale and scope. A secondary question in some of these studies
concerns the role of organizational form in generating cost efficiencies through consolidation.
DIFFERENCES IN EFFICIENCY BY OWNERSHIP STATUS
The hospital industry in many countries is a unique example of a market in which public,
private non-profit, and private for-profit organizations coexist. This unique market structure
provides an interesting setting in which to determine if ownership structure gives way to
meaningful differences in cost or production efficiencies. Evidence of any and the extent of
differences in productive efficiency have implications for health care reform policy. Not
surprisingly, a number of statistical studies seek to determine if ownership form matters in
production efficiency. Taken together, the evidence in these studies suggests that competition
among hospitals is more likely to affect efficiency than ownership status.
Burgess and Wilson compare technical efficiency of hospitals producing multiple outputs by
four ownership types: private non-profit; private for-profit; federal; and state and local
government.36 Their empirical methodology, data envelopment analysis (DEA), has been
widely used to measure technical efficiency in many industries, although its methods tend to
produce biased and inconsistent estimates of technical efficiency. In any event, the authors find
evidence of differences in technical efficiency across ownership types but are unable to
attribute those differences to a particular source; they thus conclude that one type of ownership
form is not universally more inefficient than another.
An alternative method to measuring technical efficiency is to use the stochastic ray frontier
production function model. This model is used by Rosko37 and Sari38 to analyze the impact of
market concentration, managed care, and ownership status on hospital cost efficiency. Rosko’s
sample is 1,631 U.S. hospitals during the period 1990 to 1996, while Sari’s analysis is
restricted to hospitals in Florida from 1990 to 1997. The effect of managed care on hospital
efficiency was of particular interest during this period of rapid managed-care growth. 
36 J.F. Burgess and P.W. Wilson, “Hospital Ownership and Technical Inefficiency,” Management Science 42 (1, 1996):
110-123.
37 M.D. Rosko, “Cost Efficiency of US Hospitals: A Stochastic Frontier Approach,” Health Economics 10 (2001): 539-
551.
38 N. Sari, “Efficiency Outcomes of Market Concentration and Managed Care,” International Journal of Industrial
Organization 21 (2003): 1571-1589.
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Managed-care organizations were expected to restrain growth in health care spending in part by
pressuring hospitals to operate more efficiently. The notion is that managed-care organizations
with sufficient market power have the upper hand in negotiations regarding payment rates for
hospitals, while hospitals in more competitive markets or hospitals operating in markets
dominated by a few large managed-care organizations will be pressured to accept larger discounts
from managed-care payers and will need to become more cost efficient in order to remain
financially viable. Both Rosko and Sari find that hospital inefficiency decreases with increased
managed-care penetration. Sari finds a U-shaped relationship between hospital inefficiency and
market concentration in which there are immediate efficiency gains as the market becomes
concentrated and reaches a peak, then efficiency losses begin to occur as the market becomes
further concentrated. Rosko finds evidence of efficiency gains in less competitive (more
concentrated) markets. Finally, with respect to ownership form, Rosko’s results indicate that for-
profit hospitals are less efficient than non-profit hospitals. Sari finds the opposite in his sample of
Florida hospitals, where non-profits are less efficient than for-profit hospitals.
Potter39 and Wilcox-Gok40 examine the effects of ownership status on efficiency using reduced-
form-estimation methods. Both studies are motivated by assertions that changes in competitive
and regulatory environments might force non-profit hospitals to behave similarly to for-profit
hospitals. The undesirable outcome of this convergence in behaviour is purported to be a move
away from fulfilling the community service missions of non-profit hospitals. Potter uses data
for all U.S. acute-care general hospitals in 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1994; Wilcox-Gok uses data
for Florida hospitals from 1984 to 1987. Potter’s results indicate that non-profit and public
hospitals have lower expenses than for-profit hospitals but that ownership type is a less
important determinant of expenses over time. This evidence suggests that non-profit and for-
profit hospitals are converging over time with respect to efficiency. Wilcox-Gok finds no
difference in hospital costs by ownership type.
In summary, the evidence on the effect of ownership structure and competition on costs and
efficiency is mixed. Burgess and Wilson41 find evidence of differences in technical efficiency
across ownership type but cannot conclusively identify what factors are responsible for those
differences. In a similar vein, Wilcox-Gok42 finds no difference in hospital costs by ownership
type. Rosko43 finds that for-profit hospitals are less efficient than non-profit hospitals, while
Sari44 finds that non-profit hospitals are less efficient than for-profit hospitals. Finally, Potter’s
results45 indicate that non-profit and public hospitals have had lower expenses than for-profit
hospitals in the past, but that non-profit and for-profit hospitals are converging in efficiency
over time.
39 S. Potter, “A Longitudinal Analysis of the Distinction between For-profit and Not-for-profit Hospitals in America,”
Journal of Health and Social Behavior 42 (1, 2001): 17-44.
40 V. Wilcox-Gok, “The Effects of For-profit Status and System Membership on the Financial Performance of
Hospitals,” Applied Economics 34 (2002): 479-489.
41 Burgess and Wilson, “Hospital Ownership and Technical Inefficiency.”
42 Wilcox-Gok, “The Effects of For-profit Status and System Membership.”
43 Rosko, “Cost Efficiency of US Hospitals.”
44 Sari, “Efficiency Outcomes of Market Concentration and Managed Care.”
45 Potter, “A Longitudinal Analysis.”
EFFICIENCY GAINS THROUGH CONSOLIDATION
The hospital industry in the United States experienced significant restructuring in the second
half of the 1990s, a time that corresponds to the government-inspired restructuring that took
place in Ontario. Unlike in Ontario, the impetus for the large number of hospital consolidations
across the United States was the fiscal pressure placed on hospitals by fundamental changes to
the Medicare payment system and the rapid growth of managed care for privately insured
patients. The wave of hospital mergers has generated interest on both the academic and policy
fronts because its net impact on consumer welfare is unclear. Hospital executives argue that
consolidation is beneficial because of the cost efficiencies achieved through eliminating excess
capacity and streamlining operations. Insurers argue that the reduction in competition achieved
through consolidation is harmful because the increase in hospital market power leads to
increases in prices.
The form that organizational restructuring takes is an important consideration in analysis of the
effect of consolidation on system costs. Acquisition of U.S. hospitals in distinct geographic
markets by national systems such as Hospital Corporation of America and Humana is less
likely to result in cost efficiencies than a merger of two hospitals located in the same
geographic market, where services are truly consolidated and excess capacity eliminated — the
type of restructuring that motivated the Ontario reform. In between these types of structures is
the local hospital system where two or more hospitals have common ownership but maintain
separate physical facilities and keep separate financial records.
Turning first to the Ontario example, Preyra and Pink examine whether the widespread
restructuring of the hospital industry that began in 1996 could be expected to achieve the
efficiency gains predicted by the provincial regulators using an accounting-based framework.46
As background, Ontario created a Health Services Restructuring Committee that had the
authority to direct hospitals to restructure through consolidations, program transfers, and
closures in an effort to reduce system costs. In 1996, the province announced hospital funding
cuts of 15% over three years, to be offset by the efficiency gains realized through
restructuring.47 The provincial government relied on estimates of cost savings derived not from
economic-cost models but from accounting-based methods to determine how the hospital
industry would be restructured. Using data for the two years preceding the start of Ontario’s
consolidation effort, Preyra and Pink find that cost savings are achievable through exploiting
returns to scale and scope under a variety of consolidation options, such as merging community
hospitals, consolidating tertiary services, and creating networks for small hospitals.
The evidence on efficiency gains through consolidation in the United States is mixed but
demonstrates that the type of consolidation and local market conditions are key determinants of
the effects of mergers and acquisitions. An early study in this area is that of Connor, Feldman,
and Dowd,48 who examine the effect of local hospital mergers on hospital costs and prices
using data for 3,500 acute-care general hospitals from 1986 to 1994. Although the data used in
the study are for a period preceding the wave of hospital mergers in the second half of the
46 C. Preyra and G. Pink, “Scale and Scope Efficiencies through Hospital Consolidations,” Journal of Health
Economics 25 (2006): 1049-1068.
47 Ibid., 1050.
48 R.A. Connor, R.D. Feldman, and B.E. Dowd, “The Effects of Market Concentration and Horizontal Mergers on
Hospital Costs and Prices,” International Journal of the Economics of Business 5 (2, 1998): 159-180.
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1990s, the study is informative because it includes hospitals across the United States and
exploits variations in the degree of competition across geographic areas to examine how
competition affects hospital costs and prices. It also takes advantage of the longitudinal nature
of the data to see how competition has changed through mergers and consolidations, as well as
the effect of consolidation on prices and costs. The authors provide support for the hypothesis
of the existence of a “medical arms race” in 1986 by finding that costs and prices were higher
in more competitive (or less concentrated) markets.49 By 1994, however, this relationship no
longer held, suggesting a move away from non-price toward price-based competition. The
effect of ownership form on costs, prices, and operating margins also changed. There was no
significant effect of the 1986 interaction term between ownership status and market
concentration on changes in costs or prices from 1986 to 1994, suggesting that for-profit
hospitals did not take more or less advantage of market power in making pricing decisions than
did non-profit hospitals. Also, while for-profit hospitals had higher prices than non-profit
hospitals in 1986, theirs did not increase as much as those of the non-profit hospitals over the
nine-year study period. The authors also find some evidence of merger-based cost efficiencies:
hospitals that merged over the study period had smaller cost increases than hospitals that did
not merge, although the results are likely biased because the exact timing of the merger was
not accounted for in comparing costs in 1986 and 1994.
Spang, Bazzoli, and Arnould50 employ a similar design to study the effect of competition and
mergers on hospitals costs and prices over a period (1989-1997) that includes some of the heavy
merger activity of the second half of the 1990s. Of 1,767 acute-care general hospitals in the
sample, 204 were involved in mergers. The authors compare merged hospitals to non-merged
rival hospitals (hospitals operating in the same geographic market) as well as to non-merged,
non-rival hospitals (hospitals operating in different geographic markets). They find that the
growth of costs in merged hospitals was lower than in non-merged rival and non-rival hospitals,
but that the presence and extent of savings vary with market and hospital conditions. Their results
suggest that cost savings are highest for mergers occurring in more competitive markets and
when low-occupancy (and, hence, excess capacity), non-teaching, or non-profit hospitals merge.
The cost savings, however, are lower than those reported in studies using earlier data.
Alexander, Halpern, and Lee51 study the short-term effect of 194 mergers between 1980 and
1990 on the scale of activity, personnel/staffing practices, and operating efficiencies. Assuming
that hospitals consolidate to generate efficiencies through streamlining their operations in order
to remain competitive, the authors hypothesize that the post-merger period will be
characterized by reduced scale of operation, leaner staffing practices, and improvements in
operating efficiency.52 Merger effects were determined by comparing the levels and rates of
change for each operating characteristic three years prior to and three years following the
merger. The authors find some evidence that costs per adjusted admission were lower in the
post-merger period.
49 The “medical arms race” hypothesis is the notion that hospitals compete not on the basis of price but for physicians
who admit patients. Hospitals compete for physicians by racing to acquire the best in equipment and medical
technology.
50 H.R. Spang, G.J. Bazzoli, and R.J. Arnould, “Hospital Mergers and Savings for Consumers: Exploring New
Evidence,” Health Affairs 29 (4, 2001): 150-158.
51 J.A. Alexander, M.T. Halpern, and S.Y. Lee, “The Short-term Effects of Merger on Hospital Operations,” Health
Services Research 30 (6, 1996): 827-847.
52 Ibid., 828.
Two studies analyze local hospital systems in California in two different years (1988 and 1991)
to determine if there is evidence of cost efficiencies through consolidation.53 They compare the
performance of these systems with that of “pseudo-systems”’ that are created by aggregating
independent hospitals so as to match the actual systems in terms of size, ownership, and
location. Unlike the other studies discussed here, these two find no evidence that their hospital
systems have lower patient care costs than non-integrated systems. Dranove and Lindrooth54
employ a similar method to investigate separately whether consolidation through merger or
through system affiliation generates cost efficiencies. They examine costs in merged or
affiliated system between 1988 and 1996 in both their pre- and post-merger periods and their
matched pseudo-systems. They find that consolidation into systems does not generate cost
savings, even after four years, but that merged systems do experience savings, primarily
through capacity reductions.55 The cost savings realized by consolidated for-profit hospitals
were greater than those by consolidated non-secular, non-profit hospitals.
In summary, the evidence on efficiency gains through consolidation is also mixed. U.S. studies
demonstrate that both the type of consolidation and local market conditions are important
determinants of the effects of mergers and acquisitions. Connor, Feldman, and Dowd find different
effects at different points in their sample, indicating a change in the way hospitals compete over
time.56 Spang, Bazzoli, and Arnould find evidence of efficiency gains through mergers, but point
out that both the presence and extent of savings vary with market and hospital conditions.57
Alexander, Halpern, and Lee also find evidence of lower costs in post-merger periods.58 In
contrast, other studies do not find evidence of efficiency gains through consolidation.59
THE EFFECT OF PAYMENT SYSTEM REFORM ON EFFICIENCY
Gerdtham et al.60 use a stochastic frontier approach to test for the existence and magnitude of
the effect of a new form of hospital reimbursement on technical efficiency in the Swedish
public hospital system over the period from 1989 to 1995. Their results are relevant for Canada
given the similarities in the organization of the two countries’ health care systems. The
Swedish reform examined in this study separated the purchaser and provider roles within the
26 County Councils that are responsible for the country’s health care services. The policy
moved away from hospital reimbursement via a global budgeting process to output-based
reimbursement schemes such as fee-for-service. It is worth noting that, although the authors do
not address how this change might have created incentives for improvements in technical
efficiency, their results indicate that output-based reimbursement methods improved technical 
53 D. Dranove and M. Shanley, “Cost Reductions or Reputation Enhancement as Motives for Mergers: The Logic of
Multihospital Systems,” Strategic Management Journal 16 (1995): 55-74; and D. Dranove, A. Durkac, and M.
Shanley, “Are Multihospital Systems More Efficient?” Health Affairs 15 (1, 1996): 100-104.
54 D. Dranove and R. Lindrooth, “Hospital Consolidation and Costs: Another Look at the Evidence,” Journal of Health
Economics 22 (2003): 983-997.
55 Ibid., 996.
56 Connor, Feldman, and Dowd, “The Effects of Market Concentration.”
57 Spang, Bazzoli, and Arnould, “Hospital Mergers and Savings for Consumers.”
58 Alexander, Halpern, and Lee, “The Short-term Effects of Merger on Hospital Operations.”
59 Dranove and M. Shanley, “Cost Reductions”; Dranove, Durkac, and Shanley, “Are Multihospital Systems More
Efficient?”; and Dranove and Lindrooth, “Hospital Consolidation and Costs.”
60 U.G. Gerdtham, M. Lothgren, M. Tambour, and C. Rehnberg, “Internal Markets and Health Care Efficiency: A
Multiple-output Stochastic Frontier Analysis,” Health Economics 8 (1999): 151-164.
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efficiency by 9.7% on average. At first glance, this result appears counterintuitive in light of
theoretical results from Ellis61 that retrospective output-based reimbursement systems (such as
fee-for-service) overprovide services relative to prospective output-based systems (such as per
case or per diem payments). Ellis’s analytical model does not examine the impact of payment
systems on technical efficiency, which is the subject of the Gerdtham et al. study, but the two
results are not necessarily at odds if movement from global budgets to output-based
reimbursement results in an increase in the number of patients treated per unit of input.
Quality
Determining the impact of ownership type and competition on the quality of care is an
empirically challenging exercise because quality is difficult to measure. Nonetheless, a number
of studies have attempted to examine these relationships because of their implications for
public policy in the area of health care reform. Policy-makers must balance the often
conflicting objectives of maintaining fiscal sustainability and ensuring the provision of quality
care. Most of the studies conducted since 2000 generally do not support the contention that for-
profit hospitals sacrifice quality at the expense of profits or that competition harms quality.
However, studies examining the effect of conversion from one ownership type to another do
find some evidence of lower quality in hospitals that converted from non-profit to for-profit
status. One should not construe these findings as unambiguous evidence that quality is lower in
for-profit hospitals; instead, they suggest that non-profit hospitals that convert to for-profit
status are more likely to be of lower quality than non-profit hospitals that do not convert.
THE EFFECT OF COMPETITION AND OWNERSHIP ON QUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Among the studies examining the impact of competition on patient outcomes is that of Ho and
Hamilton,62 who focus on the effect of a reduction in competition through acquisitions and
mergers on the quality of hospital care. They compare the quality of care in hospitals before
and after mergers and acquisitions in California between 1992 and 1995, as measured by in-
patient mortality for heart attack and stroke patients, rate of 90-day readmissions for heart
attack patients, and rate of discharges within 48 hours for normal newborns. They find no
tangible impact of a decrease in competition on in-patient mortality but argue that this lack of
evidence might be due to an insufficient sample size of patients in consolidating hospitals. The
probability of readmission was higher in merged or acquired hospitals. Some hospital
acquisitions, particularly those in already highly concentrated markets, led to early discharge of
normal newborns. The authors conclude that reductions in competition through mergers and
acquisitions might not always compromise quality.
61 R.P. Ellis, “Creaming, Skimping and Dumping: Provider Competition on the Intensive and Extensive Margins,”
Journal of Health Economics 17 (5, 1998): 537-555.
62 V. Ho and B.H. Hamilton, “Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions: Does Market Consolidation Harm Patients?” Journal
of Health Economics 19 (2000): 767-791.
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Kessler and McClellan63 analyze the impact of hospital competition on health expenditures and
health outcomes using longitudinal data on cohorts of Medicare patients with heart disease in
1985, 1988, 1991, and 1994. An important contribution of their study is the method they use to
define hospital markets. A well-known limitation of the empirical literature on hospital
competition is that commonly used measures of market competitiveness are endogenous and
therefore might result in biased estimates of the effect of competition on outcome variables.
Kessler and McClellan address this limitation by modelling hospital choice (a critical factor in
defining markets) based on exogenous factors. They measure quality of care using a one-year
mortality rate, a one-year readmission rate for heart attacks, and a one-year readmission rate
for heart failure, and they measure health expenditures as in-patient reimbursements for all in-
patient admissions occurring within a year of the initial hospitalization. They find that the
effects of competition on expenditures and outcomes differ over time. Before 1991,
expenditures were lower in the least competitive markets than in the most competitive markets,
but patients in less competitive markets experienced higher rates of mortality and readmission
than those in the most competitive markets. Thus, from the social welfare point of view, the
effect of competition was ambiguous prior to 1991. A different story emerges after 1991, with
the results suggesting that competition unambiguously improved welfare. Treatment of heart
attack patients in the least competitive areas was costlier than in the competitive areas, and
differences grew in patients’ health outcomes across differently competitive areas. These
findings support the hypothesis that competition can lead to lower system costs and higher
quality. The relevance of the study’s finding for Canada is enhanced by the sample’s having
consisted of publicly financed U.S. Medicare patients.64
The contribution by Sloan et al.65 to the debate on how hospital ownership affects program
costs and quality departs from the studies discussed above in its use of national data on
Medicare patients who were admitted to hospitals with a primary diagnosis of hip fracture,
stroke, coronary heart disease, or congestive heart failure from 1982 to 1995. The authors
measure hospital costs in two ways: total Medicare payments during the first six months after
hospital admission, including the cost of the initial admission; and total Medicare payments
during the first six months less payments incurred during the initial admission. They measure
quality as the probability of death at one month, six months, and one year following the initial
admission. The authors find that Medicare payments were lower in non-profit and public
hospitals than in for-profit hospitals, and that ownership did not have an effect on mortality.
Taken together, these results do not lend support to the hypothesis that for-profit hospitals
improve their profit margins by sacrificing quality.
63 D.P. Kessler and M.B. McClellan, “Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?” Quarterly Journal of Economics
115 (2, 2000): 577-615.
64 Kessler and McClellan do control for ownership status, but do not report the results on the ownership variable.
65 F.A. Sloan et al., “Hospital Ownership and Cost and Quality of Care: Is There a Dime’s Worth of Difference?”
Journal of Health Economics 20 (2001): 1-21.
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Sari66 uses panel data for hospitals in 16 U.S. states from 1992 to 1997 to analyze the impact of
competition and managed care on quality. Unlike most studies that measure quality with mortality
rates and/or readmission rates, Sari uses in-hospital complications as measures of quality. The
results suggest that competition does improve quality. Sari estimates that, when evaluated at
sample means, a 10% increase in market share corresponds to a 7.6% increase in complications.
In addition, hospitals with higher market share use more inappropriate procedures.
Kessler and Geppert67 estimate the effects of competition on the level of and variation in
quality of care and hospital expenditures. This paper extends the contribution made by Tay,68
who shows that an analysis of the effect of changes in competition needs to consider both
geographic and quality (that is, vertical) differentiation; failure to do so could lead to
inaccurate predictions of merger effects. In addition, economic theory does not provide
unambiguous predictions about the effect of competition on social welfare. One viewpoint says
that reducing competition increases quality variation at the expense of social welfare. This
occurs by hospitals in less competitive markets lowering the quality of care for low-risk
patients in order to charge high-risk patients more.  Another viewpoint says that highly
concentrated (that is, uncompetitive) markets might or might not have more quality variation; it
is possible that all firms could choose a single sub-optimal quality level rather than trying to
differentiate themselves. However, evaluation of the effect of competition on average does not
allow evaluation of these hypotheses because it ignores the effect of competition on subgroups.
Kessler and Geppert examine these competing hypotheses using data for Medicare patients
with a new occurrence of a heart attack in the 1985-1996 period. They separate patients into
two groups of high and low valuation of quality based on a measure of health status, and
estimate the effect of market concentration on mortality, cardiac complications, and medical
expenditures for these two groups and for all patients. The results confirm the finding of
Kessler and McClellan69 that competition is socially beneficial on average. In addition, they
find no evidence that competition generates aggregate benefits at the expense of sub-groups of
patients. They also find that low-risk patients in competitive markets receive less intensive
treatment (so, lower expenditures) than in uncompetitive markets but have similar health
outcomes, which suggests there is no difference in the quality of care. However, high-risk
patients in competitive markets receive more intense treatment than in less competitive markets
and have better health outcomes, suggesting a higher quality of care. These findings are
consistent with the phenomenon of “cream skimming”70 but they also suggest that “cream
skimming” raises, rather than reduces, overall social welfare. With respect to hospital
ownership, Kessler and Geppert find that hospital ownership affects medical expenditures but
not the quality of care.
66 N. Sari, “Do Competition and Managed Care Improve Quality?” Health Economics 11 (2002): 571-584.
67 D.P. Kessler and J.J. Geppert, “The Effects of Competition on Variation in the Quality and Cost of Medical Care,”
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 14 (3, 2005): 575-589.
68 A. Tay, “Assessing Competition in Hospital Care Markets: The Importance of Accounting for Quality
Differentiation,” RAND Journal of Economics 34 (4, 2003): 786-814.
69 Kessler and McClellan, “Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?”
70
“Cream skimming,” also called “cherry picking,” refers to the practice of selectively providing services to high-value
or low-cost patients. It is commonly assumed that cream skimming is a negative consequence of competition, but
Kessler and Geppert suggest that this is not necessarily the case since they find that competition is socially beneficial
on average.
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THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP CONVERSION ON QUALITY
Another empirical approach to evaluating the effect of ownership form on the quality of care is
to see if there are measurable differences in quality following conversion from one ownership
form to another.71 Sloan72 measures quality using in-patient mortality rates, extended hospital
stays, and pneumonia complications during the stay occurring to patients admitted for stroke,
hip fracture, coronary heart disease, and congestive heart failure. Picone, Chou, and Sloan73
define quality using mortality at 30 days, six months, and one year following a hospital
admission. Shen74 also measures outcomes using mortality rates at different time horizons, and
combined measures of complications and mortality rates. Finally, Farsi uses a risk-adjusted
measure of in-hospital mortality and a risk-adjusted probability of readmission for AMI
patients.75
Sloan does not find any change in in-patient mortality rates following conversion from non-
profit to for-profit ownership, but he does find evidence of increased complications from
pneumonia. In contrast, Picone, Chou, and Sloan find temporary reductions in hospital quality,
as measured by in-patient mortality rates, following conversion from non-profit to for-profit
ownership, but do not find an increase in mortality rates when converting from for-profit to
non-profit status. Shen’s findings are similar to those of Picone, Chou, and Sloan — namely,
that conversion to for-profit ownership resulted in poorer patient outcomes. The evidence in
Farsi’s study regarding the effect of ownership conversions on quality is mixed. In terms of
in-hospital mortality of AMI patients, non-profit hospitals that converted to for-profit
ownership showed a slightly falling mortality rate before conversion and a significant increase
after conversion, but for-profit hospitals that converted to non-profit status experienced a
slowdown in in-patient mortality following conversion. The findings are not the same for in-
patient mortality rates for congestive heart failure patients and the readmission probability of
AMI patients; in the former, the mortality rate increased following conversion from for-profit
to  non-profit status, while in the latter, there was no significant difference. In summary, the
evidence on the effect of ownership conversion is mixed.
71 For example, see G. Picone, S.Y. Chou, and F. Sloan, “Are For-profit Hospital Conversions Harmful to Patients and
Medicare?” RAND Journal of Economics 33 (3, 2002): 507-523; Y.C. Shen, “The Effect of Hospital Ownership
Choice on Patient Outcomes after Treatment for Acute Myocardial Infarction,” Journal of Health Economics 21
(2002): 901-922; F.A. Sloan, “Hospital Ownership Conversions: Defining the Appropriate Public Oversight Role,”
Frontiers in Health Policy Research 5 (2002): 123-166; and M. Farsi, “Changes in Hospital Quality after
Conversion in Ownership Status,” International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 4 (2004): 211-
230. The samples in all of these studies are U.S. Medicare patients: Picone, Chou, and Sloan use Medicare
beneficiaries admitted to a hospital; Sloan focuses on elderly patients admitted to hospitals for stroke, hip fractures,
coronary heart disease, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia; Shen limits her analysis to Medicare patients
admitted to U.S. hospitals for AMI (heart attacks), and Farsi focuses on patients admitted to hospitals in California
for AMI and congestive heart failure.
72 Sloan, “Hospital Ownership Conversions.”
73 Picone, Chou, and Sloan, “Are For-profit Hospital Conversions Harmful?”
74 Shen, “The Effect of Hospital Ownership Choice.”
75 Farsi, “Changes in Hospital Quality.” It is worth noting that measures of quality are a point of contention in the
literature on the effect of competition and ownership on the quality of care. Quality is difficult to measure, and the
ability of some commonly used measures to measure quality effectively is questioned. As an example, mortality rates
are commonly used but are limited in their ability to measure quality in part because they are not observed for all
patient groups.
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THE EFFECT OF COMPETITION ON QUALITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Reform policies aimed at introducing competition into the publicly funded health care sector in
the United Kingdom were implemented in 1990. Similar to reform efforts in Sweden,
competition was introduced by creating an internal market with separate roles for the financing
and delivering of health care. Prior to the 1990 reforms, the U.K. health care system was a
monopoly in which local health authorities allocated public funds to provide health services
directly. Under the reforms, the roles of financier and supplier were separated through the
creation of two types of purchasers: District Health Authorities (DHAs) became responsible for
purchasing hospital services for the population in their areas who were not patients of the
second type, General Practice Fund-Holders (GPFHs), a voluntary group of primary-care
physicians who are given a budget to provide primary health care and purchase some hospital
care for their patients. Providers, both public and private, of health care services now compete
annually for contracts with purchasers. The internal market was modified in 1998 when DHAs
and GPFHs were replaced with Primary Care Trusts, who were given budgets to purchase all
health care, thereby maintaining the purchaser-provider split. The government anticipated that
the reforms would provide incentives to hospitals to compete on the basis of price and quality
that would lead to improvements in efficiencies.
The empirical literature on the impact of creating a competitive internal market on prices,
costs, efficiency, and quality is limited. Glennerster76 draws from refereed journal articles and
official publications in his synthesis of the evidence on the outcomes of the United Kingdom’s
efforts to introduce competition into the health sector. His overall conclusion is that the reform
efforts made very little difference on measurable outcomes but there is some evidence of an
impact on the effectiveness of the National Health Service (NHS) as measured by speed and
convenience of treatment and production efficiencies. The number of patients treated per unit
of real spending increased, on average, from a rate of 1.6% per year before the reforms to
about 2.0% per year after the reforms. There is evidence of reduced wait times after the
reforms and that wait times were reduced for patients whose primary-care physicians became
fundholders. Evidence on quality of care is limited and inconclusive, but there is no evidence
that “cream skimming” took place.
Propper, Burgess, and Green77 undertake one of the few analyses of the impact of competition
in the NHS on quality of care. Their measure of quality is the three-year weighted average of
hospital death rates within 30 days of an emergency admission for acute myocardial infarction
(AMI, or heart attack) for patients over age 50. They measure competition as the number of
hospitals in the subject hospital’s catchment area, which they arbitrarily define as the area
within a 30-minute drive of the hospital. They find that hospitals that face more competition
have higher death rates but that the effect is very small. An increase in competition from the
twenty-fifth percentile to the seventy-fifth percentile is associated with an increase in death rate
of 0.01. Given the well-known problems with defining hospital markets based on geographic
boundaries and death rates as a measure of quality, these results do not substantially further our
understanding of the impact of competition on quality of care in the United Kingdom.
76 H.G. Glennerster, “Competition and Quality in Health Care: The UK Experience,” International Journal for Quality
in Health Care 19 (5, 1998): 403-410.
77 C. Propper, S. Burgess, and K. Green, “Does Competition between Hospitals Improve the Quality of Care? Hospital
Death Rates and the NHS Internal Market,” Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004): 1247-1272.
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Competition and Access to Care
Both the 2001 Mazankowski report and the 2006 Health Policy Framework document78 identify
access as an important issue for Albertans. Alberta and Canada are not alone on this front, as
other jurisdictions with public insurance that provides first-dollar coverage for certain services
experience unacceptably long waiting times. From an economics perspective, this is not
surprising since allocation of health care services must occur in one form or another. Allocation
on the supply side through waiting lists is a common practice in health systems where price
does not play this role. Nonetheless, reducing waiting times often becomes an objective of
health care reform efforts, as it did when the United Kingdom introduced competition by
creating internal markets. The expected impact of the general practitioner fundholder scheme
(see the discussion below) on wait times is not clear. One hypothesis is that this practice will
create a two-tier system where fundholder practitioners are able to gain quicker access to
hospital care for their patients. The competing hypothesis is that any fundholder practices that
lead to reductions in wait times will spill over to patients of non-fundholders. Propper,
Croxson, and Shearer79 test these hypotheses using data on all elective hospital admissions in
one U.K. area from 1993 to 1997. Their empirical analysis looks for direct effects of the
scheme by determining if fundholders were able to gain faster access to hospital services for
their patients and if they obtained faster access for all patients or only those they paid for
directly out of their budgets. In addition, the authors examine evidence of indirect effects
through spillover in two ways: spillovers to fundholders’ patients having procedures performed
by non-fundholding physicians; and spillovers to patients of non-fundholder physicians having
either type of procedure.
Propper, Croxson, and Shearer do find evidence of direct effects but not of spillover effects.
Fundholding reduced waiting times for patients of fundholder practices for services paid for by
the fundholders by 8%. However, a different story with respect to non-fundholder procedures
emerged. The results suggest that fundholding increased wait times for non-fundholder
procedures: wait times for fundholder patients having non-fundholder procedures were 15%
higher than those for non-fundholder patients. Moreover, these results were driven by
differences in waiting times across specialties.80 The authors find no evidence that fundholders
were able to secure shorter wait times for their patients for non-fundholder procedures,
indicating the absence of a spillover effect.
78 Alberta, A Framework for Reform; and idem, “Health Policy Framework” (Edmonton, February 2006); available
online at http://www.health.alberta.ca/documents/Health-Policy-Framework-2006.pdf.
79 C. Propper, B. Croxson, and A. Shearer. “Waiting Times for Hospital Admissions: The Impact of GP Fundholding,”
Journal of Health Economics 21 (2002): 227-252.
80 Ibid., 240. 
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Summary
The studies reviewed in this section seek to determine what effect, if any, competition and
ownership structure have on health care system costs, quality, and access to care. Their
findings do not speak directly to the debate about the efficacy and desirability of contracting
with private, for-profit clinics for the provision of insured surgical services in Alberta, but they
are relevant to the debate about expanding the role of the private sector in Alberta’s health care
system. On the whole, the evidence does not paint a picture of doom and gloom should
competition and choice be encouraged. There is very little convincing evidence that a health
care system characterized by competition, a mix of private non-profit and for-profit providers,
and a mix of public and private financing would result in higher system costs or create a two-
tier system. There is some evidence, however, to suggest that quality is higher and social
welfare improved when there is competition among service providers.
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC PROVISION OF PRIVATE SERVICES
The United States has recent experience with new forms of competition in both the financing
and delivery sides of the health care system. On the financing side, both public programs,
Medicare and Medicaid, have experimented with injecting competition by allowing
beneficiaries to enrol in managed-care plans. Such plans can be complex, but most involve
flexibility in payment plans for providers that offer alternatives to fee-for-service payment. The
idea is that alternative payment systems create incentives for efficiency that do not exist under
fee-for-service arrangements.
On the delivery side, the growing sub-industry of physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals
has created competition with the full-service, acute-care hospitals. This growth has sparked a
heated debate among full-service general hospitals, physicians, regulatory agencies, health
professional organizations, and other players in the health care sector. The major points of
contention in the debate centre on the propensity of single-specialty hospitals to “cream skim,”
thereby threatening the financial viability of full-service non-profit hospitals and compromising
their ability to fulfill their community mission of providing care without regard to financial
considerations. Concern about the conflict of interest created by physician-owners’ financial
incentive to self-refer healthier, easier patients to their hospitals, leaving the more difficult
cases in the non-profit community hospitals, is similar to the concern voiced in Alberta that the
public purchase of surgical services will create a two-tiered system of health care. Given the
Mazankowski report’s recommendation to “reconfigure the health system and encourage more
choice, more competition and more accountability,”81 the primary questions in the U.S. debates
and the evidence gathered thus far are relevant to that Alberta debate. 
81 Alberta, A Framework for Reform, p. 7.
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Medicare Managed Care
The primary objective of the U.S. Medicare program is to provide access to health care for
persons ages 65 and over. The program shares similarities with the Canadian medicare program
in terms of organization and delivery methods. The program has four distinct parts: Part A, the
hospital insurance program; Part B, the supplemental medical insurance program that covers
physician services, out-patient care, emergency room visits, and a variety of other medical
services; Part C, the Medicare Advantage program, which is the managed-care program that
must provide the services covered under Parts A and B to enrolled beneficiaries; and Part D,
the prescription drug program.
The federal government began contracting with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to
provide a managed-care option to Medicare patients as a result of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) passed in 1982.82 The Medicare Advantage program was
introduced as the Medicare + Choice program through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 in
response to rising program costs experienced during the 1990s. The program introduced more
competition into the Medicare program by increasing the types of managed-care insurance
plans available to Medicare beneficiaries and altering payment methods for those plans. The
rationale underlying the change that managed-care plans are expected to be more efficient at
providing care, thereby reducing fiscal pressure on the federal budget.
Among numerous studies that have examined the impact of managed-care enrolment on
Medicare costs, use, and quality is a paper by Chernew, DeCicca, and Town,83 who evaluate its
impact on fee-for-service expenditures to see if the effects of managed-care penetration spill
over into the fee-for-service Medicare. A spillover effect is said to exist if physicians tend to
treat patients in a similar manner, regardless of the type of insurance coverage the patient
holds. In this case, more managed-care enrolment will affect physician practice patterns for the
fee-for-service patients and result in lower expenditures; thus, evaluation of spillover effects is
important for assessing the fiscal impact of the managed-care program. The authors do this by
regressing spending by fee-for-service Medicare patients on the share of Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in managed-care plans at the county level, using data from a nationally representative
survey covering the period from 1994 to 2001. They find evidence of substantial spillover
effects: a one percentage point increase in Medicare managed-care enrolment is associated with
0.7 to 0.8 of a percentage point reduction in fee-for-service expenditures. Over the sample
period, mean Medicare HMO penetration increased by about 8%, which means the estimated
reduction in fee-for-service expenditures was approximately 6% relative to the level it would
have been in the absence of such penetration.84
82 According to the National Library of Medicine, an HMO is a type of managed-care organization with five basic
attributes: (1) it provides care in a defined geographic area; (2) it provides or ensures delivery of an agreed-on set of
basic and supplemental health maintenance and treatment services; (3) it provides care to a voluntarily enrolled
group of persons; (4) it requires enrollees to use the services of designated providers; and (5) it receives
reimbursements through predetermined, fixed, periodic prepayments by enrollees without regard to the degree of
services provided (Facts on File Dictionary of Health Care Management, 1988).
83 M. Chernew, P. DeCicca, and R. Town, “Managed Care and Medical Expenditures of Medicare Beneficiaries,”
Journal of Health Economics 27 (6, 2008): 1451-1461.
84 Ibid., 1457.
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Town and Liu85 construct an HMO/county-level panel dataset for the years 1993 to 2000 to
estimate the welfare effect for Medicare beneficiaries of the Medicare + Choice program. They
find that creation of an alternative health insurance market to the traditional fee-for-service
insurance resulted in substantial welfare gains: approximately US$18.7 billion in total consumer
surplus, US$24.8 billion in net welfare gain, and US$52.0 billion in HMO profits over the study
period.86 They further find that gains in consumer surplus were distributed unevenly across the
country because of uneven geographic distribution of the availability of plans.
Mello, Stearns, and Norton87 examine the effect of enrolment in Medicare HMOs on
subsequent use after controlling for selection bias — the relationship between health plan
choice and use is endogenous if there is favourable selection into HMOs. Using a panel data
on Medicare beneficiaries from 1993 to 1996, the authors find that, even after controlling for
favourable selection, both the probability of admission to a hospital and the number of in-
patient days for hospitalized patients are lower for Medicare HMO patients. However, they do
not find a reduction in the use of physician services by Medicare managed-care patients
relative to fee-for-service patients.
Taken together, the findings from these studies indicate that the introduction of competition
into the U.S. Medicare program has had some beneficial effects. The evidence of beneficial
spillover effects in the form of lower expenditures in the fee-for-service market, substantial
welfare gains, and reductions in hospital use suggest that competition and choice can improve
performance and reduce fiscal pressure on the federal budget. It is important to note, however,
that these studies do not evaluate the impact of Medicare managed-care on quality or health
outcomes. If managed-care plans achieve lower use and costs by skimping on quality, this
outcome must be factored into any conclusion about the net effect of Medicare managed care.
Single-Specialty Hospitals
The emergence of for-profit, physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals in the United States
over the past 15 years is similar to the growth in private non-hospital surgical facilities in
Alberta since 1985. The growth in single-specialty hospitals is part of a larger movement of
shifting patients to alternative settings that has strained relations between hospitals and
physicians. During this time, there has also been significant growth in the number of
ambulatory surgery centres and diagnostic testing facilities. All of these organizations compete
with largely non-profit, full-service, general hospitals and, as such, are viewed as a threat to the
financial viability of these hospitals. In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, now
the Government Accountability Office) issued a report on the growth, characteristics, and
performance of single-specialty hospitals.88 At that time, 100 specialty hospitals were open and
operating, more than two-thirds of which had opened since 1990, and an additional 26
specialty hospitals were under development. More than 90% of the specialty hospitals that had
85 R. Town and S. Liu, “The Welfare Impact of Medicare HMOs,” RAND Journal of Economics 34 (4, 2003): 719-736.
86 Ibid., 720.
87 M.M. Mello, S.C. Stearns, and E.C. Norton, “Do Medicare HMOs Still Reduce Health Services Use after Controlling
for Selection Bias?” Health Economics 11 (2002): 323-340.
88 United States, General Accounting Office, “Special Hospitals: Geographic Location, Services Provided, and
Financial Performance,” GAO-04-167 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003).
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opened since 1990 were for-profit entities and most (approximately 70%) were owned, in
whole or in part, by physicians. Although federal law, known as the “Stark” anti-referral law,
generally prohibits a physician from referring Medicare and Medicaid patients to a facility in
which the physician holds financial interest, single-specialty hospitals have proliferated under
the “whole-hospital exemption.” This exemption allows physicians to have an ownership
interest in an entire hospital on the premise that any financial gain from referring a patient to
an entity as large as a general hospital would be too small to influence referral patterns.89
Single-specialty hospitals are concentrated geographically and by specialty. According to the
2003 GAO report, the 100 specialty hospitals then in existence were located in 28 states, but
two-thirds were located in only seven states: Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. The hospitals typically specialized in cardiac,
orthopaedic, or surgical services, which tend to be the most profitable in full-service general
hospitals. The vast majority (96% of those built since 1990) of single-specialty hospitals were
in states that do not regulate the growth of the hospital industry through certificate-of-need
laws. Table 4 shows the distribution of single-specialty and general hospitals by ownership
status in 2003. Table 5 puts the size of the single-specialty hospital sub-industry in the context
of the larger, full-service, general hospital industry.
TABLE 4: For-Profit and Non-profit Hospital Mix, United States, 2003
SPECIALTY SPECIALTY HOSPITALS GENERAL 
HOSPITALS OPENED 1990-2003 HOSPITALS
(percent) (percent) (percent)
For-profit 74.0 92.8 20.1
Non-profit 26.0 7.2 79.9
SOURCE: United States, General Accounting Office, “Special Hospitals,” p. 8.
TABLE 5: Medicare In-patient Spending at Specialty and General Hospitals, by Hospital Type,
United States, 2001
TOTAL MEDICARE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICARE 
HOSPITALS IN-PATIENT SPENDING IN-PATIENT SPENDING
HOSPITAL TYPE
AT SPECIALTY HOSPITALS
(number) (US$ millions) (percent)
Specialty hospitals 78 870.8 100.0
Cardiac 15 540.5 62.1
Orthopaedic 31 159.3 18.3
Surgical 16 76.2 8.7
Women’s 16 94.8 10.9
General hospitals 4,908 88,507.2 n.a.
SOURCE: Source: United States, General Accounting Office, “Special Hospitals,” p. 11.
89 See K. Carey, J.F. Burgess, and G.J. Young, “Specialization and Physician-ownership in the US Hospital Industry:
Beyond the Moratorium,” Health Economics, Policy and Law 2 (2007): 409-418; and idem, “Specialty and Full-
service hospitals: A Comparative Cost Analysis,” Health Services Research 43 (5, Part II, 2008): 1869-1887. 
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The debate surrounding the value of single-specialty hospitals in the U.S. health care industry
shares similarities with the debate in Canada, including Alberta, about increasing the role of the
private, for-profit sector in the health care system. A system in which a Medicare or Medicaid
beneficiary is treated at a single-specialty hospital and a single-specialty hospital is reimbursed
by Medicare or Medicaid for those services is tantamount to the public purchase of private
services allowed by Bill 11 in Alberta. Supporters of physician-owned, single-specialty
hospitals argue that they represent an innovative approach to the delivery of health care
services by promoting cost efficiency and by providing greater patient choice and higher-
quality health care at competitive prices. Single-specialty hospitals promote healthy
competition by setting a new competitive benchmark for hospital services. Physicians who
practise in both types of  hospital report that they can see about twice as many cases in a given
time at specialty hospitals than in full-service community hospitals.90 The potential for
financial gain comes from improved efficiency and not necessarily self-referrals of less
complex, more profitable cases. The two primary factors motivating physicians to initiate
single-specialty hospital joint ventures are to gain direct control of hospital operations
regarding patient care and to augment their income.91
The biggest opponents of single-specialty hospitals are full-service general hospitals, which
argue that the ability of physician-owners to self-refer patients to their single-specialty
hospitals creates unfair competition. The financial incentive is to target the most profitable
procedures and “cherry pick” the healthiest and best-insured patients, leaving the poorest and
sickest patients to the full-service community hospitals, which undermines their ability to
cross-subsidize unprofitable services. In essence, the argument goes, for-profit single-specialty
hospitals create the potential for a two-tiered delivery system in which profitable cases are
treated at specialty hospitals and unprofitable cases at non-profit community hospitals.
The contentious debate surrounding the accelerating growth of physician-owned, specialty
hospitals caused policy-makers to re-think the “whole hospital exception.” It became apparent
that the specialization and small size of single-specialty hospitals was closer to a sub-division
within a larger hospital that is subject to the anti self-referral legislation than to an entire
hospital, and that the opportunity for physician-owners to gain financially by their behaviour
was greater than initially envisioned. As a result, in 2003, the U.S. Congress imposed an 18-
month moratorium on payments for physician referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients to
new physician-owned specialty hospitals. This decision reflected an uncertainty in Congress
about policy prescriptions that would balance competition and regulation in health care markets
in order to maximize social welfare. A critical question to answer was whether physician-
owned, single-specialty hospitals inject “healthy” competition into hospital markets that
augment patient choices, improved quality, and make health care more affordable; or simply
create an uneven playing field for non-profit full-service hospitals that threatens their ability to
90 J. Iglehart, “The Emergence of Physician-owned Specialty Hospitals,” New England Journal of Medicine 352 (1,
2005): 80.
91 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Report to the Congress: Physician-owned Specialty Hospitals
(Washington D.C.: MedPAC, 2005); available at: http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar05 \_SpecHospitals.pdf.
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provide community services. During the moratorium, which was lifted in 2006, Congress
required that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Studies (CMS) and the Medicare Payment
Advisory Committee (MedPAC) study the effect of physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals
on general hospitals, the services provided by general hospitals that are unprofitable, and the
cost and quality of services provided by specialty hospitals. The growth in single-specialty
hospitals slowed during the moratorium but did not completely halt because they could still
treat private patients.92
THE COMPETITIVE EFFECT OF PHYSICIAN-OWNED, SINGLE-SPECIALTY HOSPITALS
Congress asked the CMS to study referral patterns of single-specialty hospitals; compare the
quality of care and patient satisfaction with care received in single-specialty hospitals with full-
service community hospitals; assess the differences in uncompensated care between the two
types of hospitals; and assess the relative value of any tax exemption available to community
hospitals.93 An important finding in the CMS report is that hospitals specializing in cardiac care
characteristically differed from orthopaedic/surgery hospitals. Cardiac hospitals more closely
resembled full-service hospitals than did orthopaedic/surgery hospitals, were larger (50-80
beds), and often had emergency rooms and community outreach programs. The proportion of
physician ownership was lower in cardiac hospitals relative to orthopaedic/surgery hospitals.
Single-specialty hospitals typically are joint ventures of physicians with a for-profit chain, a
non-profit general hospital, or some other entity. In 2003, a typical ownership structure for a
cardiac hospital was 49% physician-owned and 51% “other entity-owned.” In contrast,
physicians owned 80% of orthopaedic/surgery hospitals on average.
Another report uses a case-study approach to gather data on referral patterns and assess
differences in the provision of uncompensated care. Specifically, it identifies physician-owned
specialty hospitals and competitor hospitals in six market areas, and the sample contains four
cardiac hospitals, six orthopaedic hospitals, and one surgery hospital.94 The primary policy
issues the study evaluates are whether physician-owners refer a greater proportion of patients
to specialty hospitals and whether the cases referred to specialty hospitals by physician-owners
are more profitable than the cases they refer to competitor community hospitals. A case is
considered more profitable if it is lower acuity (less severe).
Not surprisingly, the report finds that Medicare referrals to physician-owned specialty hospitals
are positively related to the likelihood of referrals of patients to a specialty hospital. The
referral percentage ranged from 61% to 82% of admissions to the cardiac hospitals; 48% to
98% in the orthopaedic hospitals; and 90% in the one surgery hospital in the sample. Referral
patterns were different between cardiac and orthopaedic hospitals when evaluating what 
92 Carey, Burgess, and Young, “Specialty and Full-service Hospitals,” 1871. 
93 See M.O. Leavitt, “Study of Physician-owned Specialty Hospitals Required in Section 507(c)(2) of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,” Washington, DC: Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2005); available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MLNProducts/Downloads/RTC-
studyofphysownedspechosp.pdf.
94 See See L. Greenwald et al., “Specialty versus Community Hospitals: Referrals, Quality and Community Benefits,”
Health Affairs 25 (1, 2006): 106-18. The case-study, rather than a random-sample, approach was taken to select
facilities because of the disproportionate number of cardiac hospital cases.
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proportion of a physician-owner’s total Medicare caseload was referred to his own hospital. In
this case, cardiologist-owners clearly preferred to refer cases to their own hospitals whereas
most of the orthopaedic surgeon- or general surgeon-owners referred most of their cases to
competitor hospitals. The size of ownership share was an important factor in referral patterns
rather than ownership itself. Physician-owner referral patterns were not inconsistent with the
behaviour of physicians more generally. An inspection of referral patterns of competitor
physicians in one site revealed that most competitor cardiologists admitted 90% of their
patients to a single facility.95 The hypothesis that physician-owned specialty hospitals
systematically screen out more severely ill patients is not supported in this study.
A comparison of the quality of care provided in specialty hospitals and competitor hospitals
was undertaken using the following measures of quality: mortality during hospitalization and
within 30 days of discharge; complications during hospitalization; readmission within 30 days
of discharge; and discharge disposition. Except for readmission rates, outcome measures
indicate that the quality of care is high in specialty hospitals, as is patient satisfaction.
An unadjusted comparison of uncompensated care costs between specialty hospitals and full-
service community hospitals is inappropriate because of the value of the tax exemption for
non-profit hospitals. For-profit, physician-owned specialty hospitals correctly argue that their
tax payments offset their smaller share of uncompensated care. In order to respond to the
congressional mandate that the CMS evaluate differences in the provision of uncompensated
care, the CMS developed a measure of “net community benefit”: roughly, uncompensated care
plus tax payments in specialty hospitals and uncompensated care costs in non-profit hospitals.
Using this definition, the “net community benefit” measured as a percentage of total operating
revenue was found to be 3.74% in cardiac hospitals, 7.23% in orthopaedic and surgical
hospitals, and 0.87% in non-profit, full-service community hospitals.96 Thus, the hypothesis
that competition from specialty hospitals undermines the ability of non-profit community
hospitals to provide uncompensated care might have some merit but the slack is being picked
up by the specialty hospitals.
Congress also asked MedPAC to study the cost of care at physician-owned specialty and full-
service community hospitals; the financial impact of physician-owned specialty hospitals on
competitor full-service community hospitals; differences in payer mix between specialty and
full-service community hospitals; patient selection within categories of cases, comparing
specialty and full-service community hospitals; and improvements to Medicare’s in-patient
prospective payment system that should be made to better reflect the cost of care in a hospital
setting. MedPAC analyzes Medicare cost reports and in-patient claims data for 2002 for a
sample of 48 physician-owned specialty hospitals: 12 heart hospitals, 25 orthopaedic hospitals,
and 11 surgical hospitals.97
95 Ibid., 110.
96 Leavitt, “Study of Physician-owned Specialty Hospitals,” p. 58.
97 See MedPAC, Report to the Congress.
The comparison of costs between speciality hospitals and full-service community is limited by
the data available. The number of speciality hospitals is small relative to community hospitals
and they have not been operating for very long, which could bias specialty-hospital costs
upwards. Given this caveat, MedPAC compares the costs of specialty hospitals to three
comparison groups: community hospitals located in the same market as specialty hospitals and
providing a full range of services; competitor hospitals that are a subset of community
hospitals located in the same market as specialty hospitals and that provide at least some of the
same services as specialty hospitals; and peer hospitals that are specialized, not physician-
owned, and not necessarily in the same market as specialty hospitals.98 A comparison of
adjusted in-patient costs per discharge reveals that the aggregate mean and median values for
costs in physician-owned specialty hospitals were higher than those in peer, competitor, and
community hospitals, but the differences are not statistically significant. Interestingly, lengths
of stay were shorter in specialty hospitals — other things being equal, shorter length of stay
should lead to lower costs unless the intensity of services in the specialty hospitals is
sufficiently greater than in full-service general hospitals. Other factors that might explain this
finding is lack of economies of scale, higher capital costs, and start-up costs.
MedPAC does find evidence of differences in payer mix. An analysis of discharge volume at
specialty hospitals, community hospitals in the same market, and peer hospitals shows that
physician-owned specialty hospitals treated fewer Medicaid patients. Physician-owned cardiac
hospitals derived 58% of their revenue from Medicare while orthopaedic and surgery hospitals
got the majority of their revenue (64%) from private insurance.99
The approach the MedPAC study takes to evaluate the incentive to focus on more profitable
cases differs from that of the CMS analysis. MedPAC examines growth rates in several types
of cardiac surgeries at the market level to determine if markets with physician-owned cardiac
hospitals had above-average increases in per capita use rates between 1996 and 2000. It finds
that surgeries grew by 5.5% for Medicare beneficiaries in markets with a single-specialty
hospital and by 4.4% in markets without a single-specialty hospital, but that the difference is
statistically insignificant. There is limited evidence that the entrance of a physician-owned
cardiac hospital into a market increased the volume of highly profitable surgeries. Specifically,
highly profitable CABG surgeries declined over this period across markets due to the
substitution of angioplasties, but the rate of decline was slower in markets with a single-
specialty cardiac hospital. On the other hand, the differences in rates of growth of modestly
profitable angioplasties and potentially unprofitable defibrillator implantation were not
statistically different, although the direction of the differences in use is consistent with what
would be predicted by the financial incentives of single-specialty hospitals.100
98 Ibid., p. 13.
99 Ibid., p. 19.
100 Ibid., p. 23.
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MedPAC also assesses the impact of physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals on community
hospitals’ financial performance by comparing the profit margins of community hospitals in
markets with physician-owned specialty hospitals to those of community hospitals in markets
without physician-owned specialty hospitals. The period covered, 1997 to 2002, represents
both the pre- and post-entry years of the specialty hospitals. The results suggest that the
competition created by the entry of single-specialty hospitals had little to no impact on the total
margins of community hospitals.101
An ongoing concern regarding Medicare’s payment system for in-patient care is that it creates
financial incentives to specialize in “profitable” DRGs such as cardiac and orthopaedic surgery
and, within those DRGs, to selectively admit low-cost patients. Within these incentives, the
opportunity for financial gain is greater in a single-specialty hospital. MedPAC’s analysis of
patients admitted to specialty and community full-service hospitals indicates that the DRGs
represented in the single-specialty hospitals were generally more profitable than the average
DRG, and that specialty hospitals had lower-severity patient mixes than community
hospitals.102
The GAO was asked to study the competitive response of full-service general hospitals to the
presence of specialty hospitals in their market area. In response to this request, the GAO
undertook a survey of a sample of general hospitals in markets with at least one specialty
hospital that had opened since the beginning of 1998 and a comparison sample of general
hospitals in markets where there were no specialty hospitals. The survey contained questions
about the hospitals’ perceptions on the competitive landscape in their markets. Hospitals were
asked to report on operational and clinical services changes they made from 2000 to 2005 to
remain competitive in their markets.103 The GAO report finds little evidence that the nature of
competition is different when it comes from a single-specialty hospital. Nearly all hospitals
surveyed indicated growth in competition, but the growth came from other general hospitals as
well as from other limited-service facilities such as specialty hospitals, imaging centres, and
ambulatory surgical facilities. Further, there was no evidence that hospitals made more or
fewer changes or different types of changes to remain competitive if some of their competition
came from physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals.104
A study by Chollet, Lui, and Gimm105 focuses on single-specialty hospitals (termed “niche”
hospitals) in Texas. Two of the three areas of study in the report are similar to those contained
in the CMS and MedPAC reports. The first is a comparison of the financial status of single-
specialty hospitals and full-service general hospitals in Texas and a statistical analysis of the
impact of specialty hospitals on full-service hospital margins and uncompensated care loads.
The second area studied is referral patterns — specifically, comparing referrals from physician-
owners to single-specialty and general hospitals with those from non-physician-owners who
refer to single-specialty hospitals. (The third area, which is not summarized, is a qualitative
analysis of stakeholder perceptions about the impact of single-specialty hospitals in Texas.)
101 Ibid., p. 24.
102 Ibid., p. 25.
103 United States, Government Accountability Office, “General Hospitals: Operational and Clinical Changes Largely
Unaffected by Presence of Competing Specialty Hospitals,” GAO-06-520 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2006), pp. 2-3.
104 Ibid., p. 4.
105 D. Chollet, S. Liu, and G. Gimm, “Analysis of Niche Hospitals in Texas and the Financial Impact on General
Hospitals,” Reference 6229 (Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research, 2006).
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In its descriptive comparisons, the study finds some differences in the financial status of single-
specialty hospitals and full-service general hospitals in Texas, but the statistical analysis does
not attribute these differences to the presence of single-specialty hospitals. For example, a
descriptive comparison of trends in payer mix shows that the proportion of private-pay patients
in single-specialty hospitals is quite a bit higher (54.1% in 2004) than in full-service general
hospitals (25.6% in 2004), but also that both types of hospitals experienced declines in the
share of private-pay patients from 2000 to 2004. Full-service hospitals in markets with single-
specialty hospitals had a higher proportion of private-pay patients (30.5% in 2004) than did all
full-service hospitals.106 This result likely reflects the tendency of single-specialty hospitals to
locate in areas with a higher percentage of private-pay patients. Table 6 provides the
descriptive comparison of mean operating and total margins for single-specialty and full-
service hospitals. The interesting trend is the substantially higher operating and total margins
for single-specialty hospitals from 2000-2003 but then a significant drop to a level similar to
those of general hospitals in 2004. The sharp reduction in the margins of single-specialty
hospitals might be due to increased competition from new single-specialty hospital entrants
over this time as well as to increased competition from other limited-service facilities, such as
ambulatory surgery centres.
TABLE 6: Mean Operating and Total Margins, by Hospital Type, Texas, 2000-2004
YEAR
MEAN OPERATING MARGIN
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
HOSPITAL TYPE
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Single-specialty (n=15) 9.5 18.6 18.4 12.3 3.7
All full-service (n=360) -0.9 2.4 3.7 1.8 2.2
Full-service in market with single-specialty -0.4 3.8 5.7 3.9 1.9
(n=185)
YEAR
MEAN TOTAL MARGIN
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
HOSPITAL TYPE
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Single-specialty (n=15) 9.6 18.7 18.5 12.8 0.3
All full-service (n=360) 0.7 3.5 4.4 3.1 3.2
Full-service in market with single-specialty 0.6 4.4 6.1 4.5 2.7
(n=185)
SOURCE: Adapted from Chollet, Liu, and Gimm, “Analysis of Niche Hospitals in Texas,” figs. I.9, I.10.
106 Ibid., p. 13.
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Regression analyses of operating margins, total margins, and uncompensated care as a percent
of revenue of general hospitals, with controls for the presence of single-specialty hospitals in
the market, have not found evidence that single-specialty hospitals adversely affect competing
full-service general hospitals’ financial performance. The important factor contributing to
differences in operating and total margins of full-service general hospitals was ownership
status. The operating margin of non-profit hospitals was, on average, 8.5% lower than that of
for-profit hospitals, the average total margin was 7.7% lower, and uncompensated care as a
percent of total revenues was 2% higher.107 Employing the same concept of net community
benefit used in the CMS study, it is likely that, after adjusting for payments, the net community
benefit of for-profit hospitals is larger.
Chollet, Liu, and Gimm take the analysis of referral patterns a step further than the CMS and
MedPAC reports, which were primarily interested in determining the extent of physician-owner
self-referral patterns. The financial incentive to self-refer patients to one’s own facility is self-
evident. It is important, however, to keep in mind that other factors affect referral patterns,
including patients’ preferences for single-specialty over full-service hospitals; the patient’s
insurance plan and network of providers allowed under the insurance plan; and physicians’
preferences about scheduling, staffing, and other dimensions of their work environment. Given
these factors, Chollet, Liu, and Gimm seek to determine if financial or non-financial factors
drive referral patterns. They examine referral patterns of physician owners relative to those of
non-owners with three measures: 1) patients admitted by physician-owners as a percent of all
patients admitted to physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals; 2) patients admitted by
physician-owners to single-specialty hospitals they own as a percent of all patients that
physician-owners refer to any hospital; and 3) the relative profitability of patients admitted by
physicians to a single-specialty hospital in which they have an ownership interest.108 The
analysis suggests that financial incentives are more important than non-financial factors in
determining referral patterns. Physicians admitted patients to both single-specialty and general
hospitals, but self-referrals to physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals accounted for more
than half of all discharges from single-specialty hospitals in 2004. Controlling for
appropriateness of admission, physician-owners admitted 42% of specialty-appropriate cases to
their own single-specialty hospitals, while non-owners admitted 30% of such cases. This
difference was driven by high rates of self-referral among orthopaedic hospitals. Patients
admitted to physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals in 2004 were more likely to be
privately insured and less likely to be severely ill. It is interesting to note that both physician-
owners and non-owners were more likely to refer privately insured and less severely ill patients
to single-specialty hospitals.109
Taken together, the findings of the CMS, MedPAC, the GAO, and Chollet, Liu, and Gimm do
not overwhelmingly support critics’ claims that for-profit, physician-owned, single-specialty
hospitals create an uneven playing field for non-profit, community full-service hospitals. They
find that the entry of specialty hospitals has little or no impact on the financial performance of 
107 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
108 Ibid., p. 23.
109 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
36
incumbent, full-service general hospitals. While these findings adequately inform the debate
about the competitive effects of physician-owned specialty hospitals, they all employ
descriptive analytical techniques. As a result, they provide a useful basis for policy analysis but
are limited in their ability to make causal inferences about the impact of specialty hospitals. A
few studies have begun to bridge this gap in the literature.
One such study is that of Schneider et al., who ask, “Does the presence of specialty hospitals in
a market reduce general hospitals’ financial performance?”110 They use data from Medicare’s
Healthcare Cost Reporting Information System to estimate full-service, general hospital patient
care revenue, cost, and operating margins in markets (defined as counties) with and without
physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals. Included in their models are variables that measure
the presence of an established specialty hospital in existence for at least two years and the
presence of a new specialty hospital in existence for less than one year. The results indicate
that the presence of one or more new or established specialty hospitals in a market has no
effect on patient care revenue; a negative effect on costs; and a positive effect on operating
margin. Based on these results, the authors question the claim of opponents of single-specialty
hospitals that competition from such hospitals is unfair and harms full-service general hospitals
financially. Schneider et al. also include measures of competition and ownership status in their
model, and find that patient care revenue, costs, and operating margins all increased with
increases in market concentration. For-profit hospitals had higher patient care revenues and
costs relative to non-profit hospitals, but their costs were not significantly different.
Carey, Burgess, and Young,111 however, do not agree with the findings of Schneider et al. They
focus instead on comparing the costs of physician-owned, single specialty hospitals and those
of full-service hospital competitors. They estimate hospital cost functions using stochastic
frontier regression analyses from which they generate hospital specific inefficiency measures
(see Table 7). They define markets not as counties but by using Hospital Referral Regions as
defined in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, and their data cover the period from 1998 to
2004 and are drawn primarily from Medicare Cost Reports. Their analysis focuses on the three
states with the preponderance of physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals: Texas, California,
and Arizona. They find that single-specialty hospitals as a whole are more inefficient than full-
service hospitals but most of the difference comes from orthopaedic/surgery hospitals rather
than cardiac hospitals. This finding has potentially important policy implications should the
results be substantiated in future work because cardiac hospitals are more similar to full-service
hospitals than to orthopaedic and surgery hospitals. This suggests that policies shaping the
nature of competition in hospitals market ought to recognize that not all single-specialty
hospitals are the same. However, an important limitation of this and all of the studies of the
effects of single-specialty hospitals is the lack of data both in terms of number of observations
and years in existence for single-specialty hospitals.
110 J.E. Schneider et al., “Effects of Specialty Hospitals on the Financial Performance of General Hospitals, 1997-2004,”
Inquiry 44 (2007): 322.
111 Carey, Burgess, and Young, “Specialty and Full-service Hospitals.”
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TABLE 7: Stochastic Frontier Analysis Efficiency Scores, U.S. Hospitals, 1998-2004
MEAN
NUMBER OF DIFFERENCE
HOSPITAL CATEGORY INEFFICIENCY 
OBSERVATIONS
COMPARISON
(t-value)
SCORE
All hospitals 0.280 1,018 n.a. n.a.
Full-service 0.274 975 n.a. n.a.
Single-specialty 0.425 43 full 0.151*
(2.83)
Orthopaedic/surgical 0.471 33 full 0.197*
(3.12)
Cardiac 0.277 10 full 0.003
(0.04)
*p-value in parentheses, p < 0.01.
SOURCE: Adapted from Carey, Burgess, and Young, “Specialty and Full-service Hospitals,” table 3.
Carey, Burgess, and Young also include measures of competition and ownership status in their
cost function regressions. Contrary to many studies that find no differences in costs by
ownership status, they find that for-profit hospitals have lower costs than non-profit hospitals,
which supports the theoretical prediction that for-profit hospitals have a greater incentive to
control costs. The measure of competition was insignificant.
Barro, Huckman, and Kessler112 are interested in evaluating the social benefits and costs of for-
profit, physician-owned, single-specialty hospitals. They focus on the treatment of Medicare
patients with cardiac disease at single-specialty cardiac hospitals using data from 1996 to 1999.
One approach to evaluating the net social welfare effect of single-specialty hospitals is to
examine how expenditures, treatments, and patient outcomes changed in market areas that
experienced the entry of specialty hospitals over the study period. If the entry of single-
specialty hospitals leads to lower expenditures and better outcomes, then it is unambiguously
welfare-enhancing; if it leads to higher expenditures and worse outcomes, it is unambiguously
welfare-decreasing; while any other combination could be either welfare-enhancing or —
decreasing.113 A second approach is to examine how expenditures, treatments, and outcomes of
patients admitted to single-specialty hospitals compare with those treated in full-service general
hospitals in a cross-section of markets with a single-specialty hospital. While this analysis
cannot speak to the existence of socially harmful behaviour, it is useful because it shows
whether Medicare patients at cardiac specialty hospitals are healthier, and it quantifies the
importance of these differences for observed variations in costs and outcomes.114 The authors 
112 J.R. Barro, R.S. Huckman, and D.P. Kessler, “The Effects of Cardiac Specialty Hospitals on the Cost and Quality of
Medical Care,” Journal of Health Economics 25 (4, 2006): 702-721.
113 Ibid., 703.
114 Ibid., 704.
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find evidence to support both advocates’ and critics’ contentions about the competitive impact
of single-specialty hospitals. They find lower growth rates in expenditures between 1996 and
1999 in markets with specialty-hospital entry and a decrease in mortality. They also find that
specialty hospitals chose to enter markets with healthier patients, to provide additional
intensive treatment of questionable cost-effectiveness, and to treat healthier patients within a
market. It is worth noting that these findings are consistent with those of Kessler and
McClellan that for-profit hospitals increase overall market efficiency by providing an incentive
for improved performance from non-profit hospitals while providing additional treatment of
marginal benefit.115
IS COMPETITION GOOD, BAD, OR INDIFFERENT?
The debate about the appropriate role of competition and the appropriate mix of public and
private delivery is a long one and likely to continue. At a conceptual level, health care systems
can be described simply as having three major players: payers, patients (consumers), and health
care providers (producers); and three major elements: financing, reimbursement (or payment),
and production. The structure of the system determines how the players and elements interact
in the production, consumption, and distribution of services. A cursory glance of health care
systems around the world reveals a great deal of variation in their structure. Health care reform
has been at the top of many countries’ political agendas since the early 1990s because a large
portion of health care expenditures are publicly financed and there has been persistent growth
in health care expenditures as a share of gross domestic product.
The challenge of having a health care system in place that is fiscally sustainable yet is both
responsive to the needs of the population and equitable has prompted reform policies that
consider a role for competition and private delivery. Involving the private sector in delivery is
most beneficial under two conditions. First, if contracting for services creates a bidding
process, then the process itself creates market incentives to be competitive. Second, if the
private sector has sufficient volume, then it might achieve lower costs through economies of
scale that are difficult to obtain in the public sector. In short, the beneficial involvement of the
private sector might be attainable in some health services but not in others.116 Crafting policies
that result in the appropriate mix of public, private, and non-profit delivery in health care
markets has proven to be a challenging and difficult task, but policy-makers remain undeterred
and continue to try. A by-product of this seemingly endless challenge is an extensive literature,
both academic and popular, examining the effect of competition and organizational structure on
health care markets.
115 Ibid., 718; see also Kessler and McClellan, “Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?”
116 The author thanks an anonymous referee for pointing out the conditions under which private sector delivery is likely
to be beneficial.
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Motivating this paper was the question: Can competition and profits lead to lower system costs,
higher quality, and improved efficiency in markets where for-profit and not-for-profit providers
coexist? The evidence gathered so far does not provide a definitive answer; rather, it suggests
that it depends. The conclusion that it depends does not reflect the rigour or generally high
quality of the academic studies reviewed, but the emerging fact that ownership- (or
organizational-) related differences in behaviour and the appropriate role for competition vary
greatly across health care services. Although the desire to put public, non-profit, and private
forms of organization neatly into separate boxes is appealing, it is not practical in the context
of health care because these organization types are heterogeneous and one distinct form of
delivery might not be desirable. A goal of the literature review in this paper has been to
evaluate the evidence about the interaction of ownership type and competition in health care
markets with respect to their effects on costs, quality, and access to care and in the context of
the recommendations of the Mazankowski report about creating a health care system that
encourages choice, competition, and an innovative blend of for-profit and non-profit delivery.
A qualitative assessment of recent evidence on the value of competition and a role for for-
profit delivery of health services could result in different conclusions depending on one’s
perspective. Opponents of competition and for-profit delivery could easily point to findings
that suggest that quality is lower in for-profit hospitals;117 to evaluations of the effect of general
practitioner fundholding on quality;118 or to the various studies that find no effect of ownership
on costs as convincing evidence that competition and profits do not lead to higher quality
and/or lower system costs. Advocates, however, could point to convincing evidence that
competition and profits do lead to higher quality and/or lower system costs.119
Perhaps a more constructive approach to synthesizing the evidence is to view it from both
points of view in an attempt to assess the potential role of competition and profits in enhancing
consumer welfare. This approach has merit because health care systems are complex and
involve interactions among players that are manipulated through policies that create incentives
for behaviour. However, the effects of policies are felt at the market level. Health care markets
are heterogeneous and local, making it entirely possible for policy effects to vary across
geographic markets. When viewed from this perspective, a reasonable conclusion to be drawn
from the studies discussed in this paper is that healthy competition and an appropriate blend of
public, private non-profit, and private for-profit delivery is likely to be beneficial on some
measures, indifferent on others, but not likely bad.
117 Devereaux et al., “Comparison of Mortality”; idem, “A Systematic Review”; and idem, “Payments for Care.”
118 Propper, Burgess, and Green, “Does Competition between Hospitals Improve the Quality of Care?”; Propper,
Croxson, and Shearer, “Waiting Times for Hospital Admissions.”
119 As reported in, for example, Connor, Feldman, and Dowd, “The Effects of Market Concentration”; Kessler and
Geppert, “The Effects of Competition”; Kessler and McClellan, “Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?”; Sloan,
“Hospital Ownership Conversions”; and Spang, Bazzoli, and Arnould, “Hospital Mergers and Savings for
Consumers.”
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What is the basis for the conclusion that competition and profits are not likely to be bad for
Canada’s health care system? In order to answer that question, one must first answer the
question of what constitutes a “bad” in the health care system. The objections put forth by
opponents of competition and private for-profit delivery serve the purpose of defining “bad”
for this discussion. The major objections are that competition and profits would lead to the
demise of the publicly funded and managed medicare system in its current state. The current
system would be replaced with a two-tier system that left the public system as the “provider of
last resort” for those unable to access the more desirable and higher-quality private system.
Other potentially “bad” outcomes are “queue jumping,”120 “cream skimming,” and conflicts of
interest on the part of physicians. There is much evidence in the studies presented here that
rejects the contention that competition and profits would result in a two-tier system or the
erosion of the public system, but there is some evidence of “cream skimming.” The U.S.
experience with public payers’ purchasing surgical services from single-specialty hospitals and
contracting with private managed-care companies has not been unambiguously that of higher
system costs, greater inefficiencies, or higher costs. Providers have not bailed out of the public
system by refusing to treat patients with public insurance.
The relevance of “cream skimming” deserves consideration in context of the Canada Health
Act and Alberta’s Bill 11 along two dimensions. First, is “cream skimming” likely to occur?
Second, is “cream skimming” an undesirable consequence of private, for-profit surgical
facilities? With respect to the first issue, the incentives for “cream skimming” are diminished
by the Canada Health Act’s requirement that physicians accept public payment as payment in
full. Treatment in a private surgical facility simply would reflect a change in the service
delivery model without a change in the payment system. Physicians would receive the same, or
similar, fee in both settings.121 Under this scenario, “cream skimming” might occur if higher-
risk, higher-cost patients were treated in the full-service acute-care hospitals and healthier,
lower-cost patients were treated in private, for-profit surgical facilities. But is this outcome
undesirable? “Cream skimming” is often construed as undesirable because the profitability of
non-profit hospitals would be jeopardized if lower-cost, healthier patients subsidized the costs
of higher-cost, sicker patients. However, “cream skimming” could be beneficial from a system-
level perspective if it led to an optimal allocation of patients between full-service general
hospitals and specialty clinics. It might well be more appropriate for the full-service hospital to
treat the more medically difficult cases, leaving the easier cases to the specialty clinics. The
challenge for the health authority would be to set budgets for full-service general hospitals that
allowed them to treat higher-cost patients appropriately without the need to cross-subsidize the
costs by also treating more profitable patients who do not need the full range of services
offered in the general hospital setting.
120
“Queue jumping” occurs if private clinics provide diagnostic services more quickly than the public sector; once
diagnosed, the patient returns to the public system and jumps ahead of those wholly in the public system still waiting
for their first diagnostic service.
121 As a practical matter, the situation is similar in the United States. A Medicare patient treated in a single-specialty
hospital simply reflects a change in the delivery setting but physicians agree to accept Medicare payment as payment
in full and agree not to “balance bill” patients.
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There is evidence of differences in the payer mix of for-profit and non-profit hospitals. Non-
profit hospitals treat a larger proportion of U.S. Medicare and Medicaid patients than do for-
profit hospitals. In addition, some physicians refuse to treat Medicaid and, sometimes,
Medicare patients. However, these stylized facts are not, in and of themselves, evidence that
allowing private for-profit delivery ultimately will result in a two-tier system. A health care
system runs the risk of evolving into a two-tier system if there are multiple public and private
payers and if providers lack an incentive, financial or otherwise, to participate in the public
sector. If payment rates from the public sector are below marginal cost, as is the case for many
U.S. Medicaid patients, then it should not be surprising that access to the health care system is
limited. Even if some providers choose not to participate in the public system, there is
insufficient evidence to support the prediction that the only providers willing to participate in
the public system would be those of low quality. This outcome could easily be prevented
through enforcement of quality standards and a payment system with risk adjustment. A two-
tier system is not inevitable and can be avoided with proper financial incentives and quality
standards. In fact, so long as the single-payer public payment system under the Canada Health
Act is in place, a two-tier system is unlikely to arise. The lesson to be learned from the
extensive literature on competition in health care markets is that a carefully crafted policy that
encourages competition among non-profit, for-profit, and public providers can result in a health
care system that is fiscally sustainable, ensures access to quality health care, and results in
better health outcomes. 
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